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Abstract 
   
We increasingly hear that empowering women and placing them in positions of 
leadership will lead to a safer, more prosperous world. The UN Security Council’s 
groundbreaking resolutions on Women Peace, and Security (WPS) — and U.S. law 
implementing these commitments — rest on the assumption that women’s participation in peace 
and security matters will lead to more sustainable peace, because women presumably “perform” 
in ways that reduce conflict, violence, and extremism. This idea is of heightened importance 
today because women are still vastly underrepresented in positions of leadership in the peace and 
security field, having yet to “shatter that highest and hardest glass ceiling” as Commander-in-
Chief in the United States or rise to the role of Secretary-General in the United Nations. Before 
her own historic race to become the first woman Commander in Chief, Hillary Clinton had 
prominently made the claim we increasingly hear that women’s empowerment is not only the 
right thing to do, but the smart thing to do for global and economic security.   
 
Such claims raise fundamental questions for international law, equality theory, and 
feminism. Assertions that the world would be a better—more peaceful, more prosperous—place, 
if women assumed leadership positions in peace and security matters are unapologetically 
instrumentalist and reinforce essentialist views of women. At the same time, evidence suggests 
that these claims are to some extent accurate. Thus, these assertions should be carefully 
examined. Reviewing new research, this Article argues that while some evidence supports these 
claims, the statistical evidence supporting these claims suffers from methodological flaws. 
Moreover, the forms of gender performance reflected in the data—which international law has 
organized itself around—are based on the socially constructed roles women play as caregivers, 
nurturers, and collaborators, not necessarily on their inherent biological roles. Yet, international 
law reifies these roles and the stereotypes that surround them, even as it tries to open up 
opportunities for women beyond traditional sex-segregated positions that have long relegated 
women around the world to the pink ghetto of economic inequality and inferior political and 
social status. Having to maneuver around formal equality, on the one hand, and instrumentalist 
claims that women will “save” the world, on the other, means that the category of “woman” can 
restrict even as it liberates. After all, not all women are “peace-loving,” particularly in a world 
where the women who succeed are often those who can succeed on terms defined by men. 
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Two prevailing theoretical frameworks—antisubordination and securitization—shape the 
current debate about WPS, but each ultimately falls short. This Article identifies democratic 
legitimacy as a novel third approach missing from the existing debate. As an alternative view, 
the democratic legitimacy account effectively reframes the WPS debate as one concerning 
inclusive security—emphasizing that women’s participation enhances the representativeness, 
democracy, and fairness of the process as a whole—rather than privileging the “special interests” 
of a particular group (as the antisubordination approach is accused of doing) or reinforcing 
gender essentialism (as the securitization approach does). Notably, a democratic legitimation 
paradigm is grounded in a model of inclusion that can be applied to vectors of inequality beyond 
gender, as well as to inequality at the intersection of various forms of inequality. Moreover, by 
emphasizing democratic representation, this approach insists on local ownership and bottom-up 
solutions, thereby emphasizing participation and leadership by women in conflict zones, rather 
than female global elites. Under a democratic legitimacy paradigm, women can still “save” the 
world, but in a different way than the predominant discourse would have us believe.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
We increasingly hear that empowering women and placing them in positions of 
leadership will lead to a safer, more prosperous world. The UN Security Council’s 
groundbreaking resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)1 — and U.S. law2 
implementing these commitments — rest on the assumption that women’s participation in peace 
and security matters will lead to more sustainable peace, because women presumably “perform” 
in ways that reduce conflict, violence, and extremism. This idea is of heightened importance 
today because women are still vastly underrepresented in positions of power generally and in 
leadership in the peace and security field specifically, having yet to “shatter that highest and 
hardest glass ceiling”3 as Commander-in-Chief in the United States or rise to the role of 
Secretary-General in the United Nations.4 Before her own race to become the first woman 
Commander in Chief of the United States, Hillary Clinton had prominently made the claim we 
                                                          
 
1 The first of these resolutions, S.C. Res. 1325 (Oct. 31, 2000), was followed by a series of subsequent resolutions, 
discussed infra Part I. 
 
2 See infra Part I.  
 
3 Gail Collins, The Glass Ceiling Holds, NYTimes (Nov. 11, 2016)(quoting Hillary Clinton in her concession speech 
the day after losing the U.S. presidential eletion to Donald Trump), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/opinion/sunday/the-glass-ceiling-holds.html. For a recent overview of the 
underrepresentation and status of of women and girls more generally, see, e.g., NO CEILINGS: THE FULL 
PARTICIPATION REPORT (Mar. 2015), http://www.noceilings.org/report/report.pdf (discussing data-driven analysis of 
the progress and remaining challenges in global gender equality over the past twenty years). 
  
4 A woman has yet to take the helm at the United Nations. In 2016, a global “Campaign to Elect a Woman UN 
Secretary-General” garnered substantial support and identified a talented pool of female candidates to be the next 
UN Chief. See CAMPAIGN TO ELECT WOMAN UN SECRETARY-GEN. 2016, http://www.womansg.org/ (promoting the 
slogan, “We have had 8 male Secretaries-General and our 9th should be a woman”). However, a male candidate, 
António Guterres, a former Portuguese Prime Minister and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, was 
ultimately selected. See, e.g., Portugal’s Antonio Guterres Elected UN Secretary-General, BBC NEWS (Oct. 14, 
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-37648265 (“Mr. Guterres’ nomination came despite a concerted effort to 
appoint the UN’s first female secretary general.”).  
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increasingly hear that women’s empowerment is not only the right thing to do, but the “smart” 
thing to do for global and economic security.5  
 
Such claims, which are prevalent across a variety of sectors,6 raise fundamental questions 
for international law, equality theory, and feminism. Assertions that the world would be a better 
— more peaceful, more prosperous — place if women assumed leadership positions are 
unapologetically instrumentalist and reinforce essentialist views of women. At the same time, 
evidence suggests that these claims are to some extent, though not entirely, accurate. Thus, these 
assertions should be carefully examined.  Reviewing new research, this Article argues that while 
some evidence certainly supports these claims, the statistical evidence suffers from 
methodological flaws. Moreover, the forms of gender performance reflected in the data—which 
international law has organized itself around—are based on the socially constructed roles women 
play as caregivers, nurturers, and collaborators, not necessarily on their inherent biological roles. 
The WPS agenda can be easily (mis)understood as based on an assumption that women are 
innately wired for peace. However, as WPS adherents acknowledge, not all women are “peace-
loving,” particularly in a world where the women who succeed are often those who can succeed 
on terms defined by men. To deny that at least some women can be as militaristic and hawkish as 
men is to deny women agency and self-expression. 
 
Paradoxically, the claim that women’s participation in peace and security enhances 
prospects for peace is based on traditional assumptions about women and a conventional 
understanding of women as inherently different from men, at the same time as it is geared toward 
increasing the inclusion of women in the historically male peace and security sector. The 
international and U.S. law developing in support of WPS further reifies conventional 
assumptions about women—and the gender-based stereotypes that surround them—even as it 
tries to open up opportunities for women beyond the traditional sex-segregated positions that 
have long relegated women around the world to the pink ghetto of economic inequality and 
inferior political and social status. How can women demand a right to fight in combat alongside 
                                                          
 
5 See, e.g., Lucy Madison, In Farewell Speech, Clinton Calls for “Smart Power” on Global Stage, CBS NEWS (Feb. 
1, 2013, 8:29 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57566994/in-farewell-speech-clinton-calls-for-smart-
power-on-global-stage (quoting former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as saying, “The jury is in. The evidence is 
absolutely indisputable: If women and girls everywhere were treated as equal to men in rights, dignity, and 
opportunity, we would see political and economic progress everywhere. . . . So this is not only a moral issue. Which 
of course it is. It’s an economic issue and a security issue . . . . It therefore must be central to U.S. foreign policy.”). 
 
6 As I have argued elsewhere, there is a growing trend toward using such instrumentalist claims to gain support for 
women’s rights law reform as a means of achieving other goals, such as economic development. Catherine Powell, 
Gender Indicators in Global Governance: Not Your Father’s World Bank, in BIG DATA, BIG CHALLENGES IN 
EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY MAKING (Kumar Jayasuriya ed., 2015) (updated version with latest World Bank data to 
be reprinted in 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2016)) [hereinafter Gender Indicators in Global Governance] 
(scrutinizing the use of quantitative indicators that prioritize gender equality projects that demonstrably promote 
broader economic growth and development goals over women’s empowerment initiatives that are created for the 
sake of gender equality qua gender equality, but cannot be quantitatively linked to broader outcomes). This Article 
is a sister project, aimed at examining the parallel trend toward using instrumentalism to pursue women’s rights law 
reform as a means of achieving another broad goal affecting the common good (beyond gender equality): building 
sustainable peace and security.   
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men, much less to be Commander in Chief, if the prevailing narrative is that women are more 
peace-oriented than men?7   
 
For the purposes of this Article, I am adopting a feminist analysis that views gender as 
“the social meaning given to the biological differences of sex.”8  Gender itself is “performative – 
a doing and constituting of the identity.”9 As feminist scholar Judith Butler argues, “As in other 
ritual social dramas, the action of gender requires a performance that is repeated. This repetition 
is at once a reenactment and a reexperiencing of a set of meanings already socially established; 
and it is the mundane and ritualized form of their legitimation.”10 Rather than view gender as a 
“stable identity or locus of agency,” identity should be understood as “tenuously constituted in 
time . . . through a stylized repetition of acts.”11 Embracing the approach that gender is 
performative, this Article views gender differences in the ways women and men “perform” in the 
peace and security sphere as socially constructed, rather than biologically inherent.12 On this 
account, women are not inherently more peaceful, but, because women around the world have 
traditionally been largely excluded from military, national security, and foreign policy positions, 
women have historically brought different social experiences to peace-making processes. Now 
that opportunities are rapidly opening up for women in these historically male sectors, and now 
that women are able to fight in combat positions in some countries, the way women “perform” in 
peace and security matters may shift in the not-too-distant future. Therefore, the goal of this 
Article is to consider the prevailing normative frameworks of WPS while looking just slightly 
                                                          
7 Even asking the question whether women’s participation enhances prospects for peace (as if asking women are 
inherently more peaceful) raises “the spectre of gender essentialism.” Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, More Women – But 
Which Women? A Reply to Stephanie Hennette Vauchez, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 229, 230 (2015) (making a similar point 
in discussing her own candidacy to be a judge on the European Court of Human Rights). 
 
8 Brenda Cossman, Gender Performance, Sexual Subjects, and International Law, 15 CANADIAN J. L. & JURIS. 281, 
281-82 (2002) (criticizing the fact that in international law, “[g]ender continues to be a category related in some 
fundamental way to sex” and seeking to “disrupt the pervasive understanding of gender as the cultural interpretation 
of sex” in international law”). Cossman contends that “the underlying category of sex is neither natural nor 
biologically determined, but rather, is itself discursively produced in and through gender.”  Id. (quoting JUDITH 
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990) [hereinafter GENDER TROUBLE], 
and JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX” (1993) [hereinafter BODIES THAT 
MATTER]).  But see HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
FEMINIST ANALYSIS 3 (2000) (defining “gender” as capturing “the ascribed, social nature of distinctions between 
women and men—the excess cultural baggage associated with biological sex”).  
 
9 Cossman, supra note 8, at 282. 
 
10 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 8, at 140. 
 
11 Id.  
 
12 Even “biologically oriented researchers investigating gender-related social behaviors generally acknowledge that 
first, biological predispositions can be altered over time through experience, and second, existing dispositions can be 
mitigated or overridden by situational demands.”  CHRISTOPHER F. KARPOWITZ & TALI MENDELBERG, THE SILENT 
SEX: GENDER, DELIBERATION, AND INSTITUTIONS 51 n.1 (2014) (quoting Campbell Leaper & Melanie M. Ayres, A 
Meta-Analytic Review of Gender Variations in Adults’ Language Use: Talkativeness, Affiliative Speech, and 
Assertive Speech, 11 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 328, 331 (2007)). 
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over the horizon – in recognition that gender roles are evolving and will continue to do so13 – to 
envision new conceptual frames that more adequately capture why women’s participation in 
peace and security continues to be critical to make the world a safer, better place for all.  
 
In justifying women’s participation in peace and security matters, WPS proponents draw 
on two broad prevailing theoretical frameworks, each of which is ultimately insufficient. This 
Article examines the two prevailing accounts in light of new quantitative and qualitative research 
on women’s participation in developing peace agreements, and then offers and theorizes an 
alternative, third approach. 
 
The antisubordination account14 supporting women’s participation in peace negotiations 
asserts that increasing opportunities for women’s participation is morally justified as a matter of 
equal citizenship, fairness, human dignity, and as a means of destabilizing patriarchy. However, 
critics of the antisubordination account note that the doctrinal and political commitments to 
formal equality, which are prevalent in many legal systems, frequently fail to approximate the 
desire for substantive equality underlying the antisubordination account. Further, those who 
oppose taking gender into consideration contend that determining who to bring to the peace table 
should be gender-blind and turn only on qualifications and relevant proximity to the conflict (in 
both cases, frequently defined narrowly and in male terms, based on traditional understandings 
of qualifications and the battlefield).   
 
The other major view is the securitization account, which advances women’s 
participation in peace-making as a means of enhancing the prospects for peace and deeper 
security. Because the antisubordination account suffers from the doctrinal and political 
challenges posed by formal equality, the securitization account has now become the dominant 
approach to justify WPS.15 But opponents of the securitization account assert that the data does 
                                                          
13 As one example of the shift in gender roles in the United States alone, the Pew Research Center reported in 2013 
that “[a] record 40% of all households with children under the age of 18 include mothers who are either the sole or 
primary source of income for the family. . . . The share was just 11% in 1960.” Wendy Wang, Kim Parker & Paul 
Taylor, Breadwinner Moms: Mothers Are the Sole or Primary Provider in Four-in-Ten Households with Children; 
Public Conflicted About the Growing Trend, PEW RES. CTR. SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (May 29, 2013), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/05/29/breadwinner-moms/; see also Hanna Rosin, New Data on the Rise 
of Women, TED (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.ted.com/talks/hanna_rosin_new_data_on_the_rise_of_women?utm_source=tedcomshare&utm_medium
=email&utm_campaign=tedspread. 
  
14 “Antisubordination theorists contend that guarantees of equal citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of 
pervasive social stratification and argue that law should reform institutions and practices that enforce the secondary 
social status of historically oppressed groups.” Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights 
Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9 (2004). For a more recent discussion, 
see Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality 
Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011). 
 
15 For a notable, high-profile discussion (and critique) of “securitizing” women’s rights, see Radhika 
Coomaraswamy et al., Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the 
Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, UN WOMEN 394 (2015),  
http://wps.unwomen.org/~/media/files/un%20women/wps/highlights/unw-global-study-1325-2015.pdf (recently 
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not support a conclusion that women’s participation causes more durable peace, and that the 
extent of the correlation is unclear given the difficulty of controlling for other factors. Along 
with methodological problems, critics express concerns about the dangers of essentializing 
gender and instrumentalizing feminism. 
 
This Article proposes and theorizes a novel third alternative — democratic legitimacy — 
that is missing from the current WPS debate, yet is descriptively more accurate and normatively 
more appealing than the two predominant accounts.16 Moving beyond the prevailing debate, a 
democratic legitimacy account demonstrates that increasing women’s participation in peace-
making creates a more representative, universal, democratic, and fair process with greater buy-in 
from the community as a whole. In addition to realizing the goals of both antisubordination 
(which aims to advance meaningful equality) and securitization (which aims to create sustainable 
peace based on greater buy-in from more people), a democratic legitimization account also 
performs important conceptual work independent of the two prevailing approaches. In contrast to 
the antisubordination narrative, which emphasizes equal access for members of a particular 
group (here, women) — raising the (admittedly unfair) specter of “preferential treatment” and 
“special interests”17 —  a democratic legitimacy framework offers an account of the 
representativeness and fairness of the process for all on whose behalf the process is claimed and 
power within the process allocated. In contrast to the securitization view — which rests on 
essentialist assumptions about women and an as-yet incomplete empirical record — democratic 
legitimacy addresses the fairness, not just the inefficacy, of excluding half of humanity in a 
process whose outcomes will be imposed on all. Importantly, a democratic legitimation paradigm 
is grounded in a model of inclusion that can be applied to vectors of inequality beyond gender, as 
well as to inequality at the intersection of various forms of inequality.18 Moreover, by 
emphasizing democratic representation, this approach insists on local ownership and bottom-up 
                                                          
released UN-commissioned global study on the implementation of Resolution 1325, warning that the WPS agenda 
should not be “securitized” and “women should never be used as instruments in any military strategy”).  
 
16 Cf. Julie C. Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to Corporate Boards, 10 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 449 (2012) (proposing “democratic governance” and “democratic legitimacy” as effective ways in which 
state and corporate gender quotas have been framed in Europe); Julie C. Suk, Quotas and Consequences: A 
Transnational Re-evaluation, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 2 (Deborah Hellman & 
Sophia Moreau eds., 2013) (discussing deontological and consequentialist accounts of affirmative action and 
proposing “parity democracy” or “gender balance” as the best way to support it). 
 
17 For powerful critiques of the notions of “preferential treatment” and “special treatment,” see Luke Charles Harris 
& Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action as Equalizing Opportunity: Challenging the Myth of “Preferential Treatment,” 
in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: AN ANTHOLOGY 492 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 3d ed. 2007); and Kimberle Crenshaw, A 
Preference for Deception: Ward Connerly Steals the Language of Civil Rights to Halt Affirmative Action, MS., 
(Winter 2008), http://www.msmagazine.com/winter2008/WardConnerlyPart2.asp.  
  
18 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women 
of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). Crenshaw originally developed the legal theory of intersectionality in the 
context of antisubordination theory, but this powerful concept can also be applied in the context of democratic 
legitimacy, given that the underrepresentation of women is compounded at the intersection of other forms of 
disenfranchisement, such as subordination based on race and ethnicity. 
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solutions, emphasizing participation and leadership of women in conflict zones, rather than 
female global elites.  
 
A democratic legitimacy approach would more effectively reframe WPS as “inclusive 
security,” a term coined by Ambassador Swanee Hunt that refers to “a diverse, citizen-driven 
approach to global stability, emphasiz[ing] women’s agency, not their vulnerability,” by 
including women in decision-making about peace and security.19 But while Ambassador Hunt 
approaches inclusive security from a primarily securitization-based perspective,20 this Article 
uses the notion of inclusive security to ground a rationale for WPS based on democratic 
legitimation. As discussed in Part I, civilian women often experience war differently than 
combatant men. At least in the short term — while this gendered divide still exists —gender-
balanced processes can lead to more durable peace, assuming other conditions are present. 
However, because gender is socially constructed and identity is “tenuously constituted in time,”21 
over the longer run, the essentialist view inherent in the securitization account may not hold up if 
women begin to perform in different ways as gender roles change.  
 
Thus, the challenge that WPS seeks to address is a transitional justice problem. Just as 
societies have transitioned from systems of grave injustice to more democratic arrangements, 
WPS is part of a gender equality transition that is shifting societies around the world from 
systems in which women are largely excluded to structures that are more inclusive and reflect 
more equal distributions of power. As Antonio Gramsci noted, in such moments of transition, we 
live in a period of chaos and struggle as we build the new system.22 WPS should be understood 
as a vehicle to assist in the transition to the new system of greater inclusion. 
 
From a democratic legitimacy perspective, greater gender parity is important, not 
necessarily because it will always lead to more peaceful substantive outcomes but because, when 
women are included, the inputs into the process include members of the community who are 
newly entitled to participate as equal citizens and who bring to the table worthy experiences and 
perspectives that would otherwise be absent. Creating a more representative, universal, 
democratic, and fair process by including such “outsider” perspectives not only secures greater 
buy-in from the community as a whole but also reveals blind spots, thereby providing more 
complete information and limiting the possibilities for misunderstanding. By upending the notion 
that performing in ways commonly associated with “masculinity” is always the ideal, gender 
                                                          
19 Swanee Hunt & Cristina Posa, Women Waging Peace: Inclusive Security, FOREIGN POL’Y, May/June 2001, at 38.  
  
20 Note that while Ambassador Hunt approaches WPS from a securitization perspective, she acknowledges that 
women should be free to exercise their own agency in, for example, choosing militarism over peace, and that 
therefore women’s participation does not always necessarily lead to more peaceful outcomes. Swanee Hunt, Who 
Decides on War and Peace? Revolutionizing Leadership for Global Security, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 13, 
2015), http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/decides-war-peace-revolutionizing-leadership-global-
security/p36567. 
  
21 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 8, at 140.  
 
22 ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI 276, (Quintin Hoare & 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1999). 
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diversity not only creates a more equal distribution of power but also establishes a different and 
often better dynamic for deliberation for both women and men. As political scientists Karpowitz 
and Mendelberg note, “masculine leadership styles are in some ways risky not only for women 
but also for the men who engage in them.”23 In fact, “an environment where subordinates are 
cultivated and supported credit is shared, and conflict is handled through honest and open 
communication [social behavior commonly associated with women] can be quite positive for 
everyone involved.”24 
 
Why does this matter? Despite the end of the Cold War, armed conflict is still 
prevalent.25 For its part, the United States has been at war continuously since the start of its 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. While women’s representation in the peace and security sectors 
is still small,26 it is growing. Given the steady emergence of women in these sectors — including 
women in prominent foreign policy leadership roles and (with the end of the combat ban) women 
in combat roles in the U.S. military27 —the data and theoretical rationales underlying calls to 
increase women’s participation in these fields have broad implications, not only for matters of 
war and peace writ large, but also for a range of activities in between, including conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, and stabilization. 
 
Part I of this Article provides a legal framework for and additional background on WPS, 
analyzes why so few women are involved in making peace agreements, and examines new 
research demonstrating a correlation between women’s participation and the durability of peace 
agreements. In light of this research, Part II explores the antisubordination and securitization 
accounts that justify increasing women’s participation in peacemaking, as well as criticisms of 
these accounts. As an alternative framework, Part III proposes a new, third rationale for women’s 
representation based on a theory of democratic legitimacy — a point thus far obscured in the 
current WPS debate. Part IV demonstrates that a democratic legitimation approach holds the 
greatest potential to move beyond the existing accounts and to reframe WPS as “inclusive 
security.”28 In a sense, then, women can still “save” the world, but in a different way than the 
predominant discourse would have us believe. 
                                                          
23 See KARPOWITZ & MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 53. 
 
24 Id.  
  
25 See, e.g., Therése Pettersson & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014, 52 J. PEACE RES. 536, 536, 
(2015) (noting that 2014 saw “the highest number of conflicts reported since 1999” and “the highest number of 
battle-related deaths in the post-1989 period” due to the “escalation of several conflicts, coupled with the extreme 
violence in Syria,” though “compared to the large-scale interstate wars of the 20th century, the number of fatalities 
caused by armed conflicts in 2014 was relatively low”). 
 
26 See infra Part I.  
 
27 Bill Chappell, Pentagon Says Women Can Now Serve in Front-Line Ground Combat Positions, NPR (Dec. 3, 
2015, 11:56 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/12/03/458319524/pentagon-will-allow-women-in-
frontline-ground-combat-positions.  
 
28 Hunt & Posa, supra note 19, at 47.   
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I. Women’s Participation in Peace Processes 
  
While the number of women in peace and security sectors is still extremely small, women 
are increasingly playing integral roles in peace processes. Following an explosion of feminist 
international law criticism, doctrinal developments, and sudden attention by human rights 
organizations to women’s rights at the end of the twentieth century,29 the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1325 on WPS in 2000. Even at that early juncture, the assumption that 
women’s participation in peace and security issues would lead to a more peaceful and secure 
world was deeply embedded in the way policymakers framed WPS. 
 
Section A of this Part explains the legal framework and how shifting legal norms embed 
changing assumptions about gender and gender equality. Section B explores why there are still 
so few women involved in developing peace agreements. Section C unpacks new research to 
investigate the relationship between women’s involvement in peacemaking and prospects for 
securing sustainable peace.   
 
A. Legal Framework: Embedding Gender Norms 
 
In adopting UNSCR 1325, the Security Council highlighted the disproportionate impact 
of conflict on women and called for greater representation of women in the resolution of conflict 
and peace-building. In other words, it stressed that international law and international relations 
should view women not only as victims of war (including of rape and other crimes of sexual 
violence that occur in armed conflict), but also as agents of securing and sustaining peace 
through their roles in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict 
reconstruction, and stabilization. In so doing, Resolution 1325 developed a whole new field of 
inquiry on women, peace, and security. In response, the United States30 and at least sixty-three 
countries31 have implemented Resolution 1325 as domestic law.32  
                                                          
29 The 1990s included, inter alia, the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing; the founding of 
women’s rights divisions at Human Rights Watch and other organizations; calls to “mainstream” gender in multi-
lateral institutions; and the inclusion of rape and other forms of sexual violence as a crime in the International 
Criminal Court statute (following the partially successful push to have sexual violence addressed in the war crimes 
statutes and jurisprudence growing out the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda). 
  
30 Exec. Order No. 13,595, 3 C.F.R. § 321 (Dec. 19, 2011). 
 
31 As of May 2016, sixty-three nations have created a National Action Plan (NAP) on United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. National Action Plan Resource Center, INCLUSIVE SECURITY, 
https://actionplans.inclusivesecurity.org/. At least sixteen additional NAPs are currently being developed. Id. 
 
32 Whether Resolution 1325 itself is legally binding as matter of international law is a matter of debate, but is not 
entirely relevant for this Article. The United States has made Resolution 1325 legally binding via Executive Order 
1355, and other countries have also incorporated it into their respective domestic laws. See sources cited supra notes 
30-31. In any event, for international law purposes, UNSCR 1325 is a legal norm, whether binding or not (i.e., 
whether hard or soft law). While others have addressed the question of the binding nature of the international law 
norm, the purpose of this Article is to address its conceptual underpinnings. For an inquiry into whether UNSCR 
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Resolution 1325 urges national governments and the United Nations to take action in at 
least three key ways. First, it calls for women’s participation in decision-making and peace 
processes.33 Second, it calls on all parties to armed conflict to respect the “rights and protection 
of women and girls, especially as civilians.”34 Third, the Resolution outlines a number of steps to 
include gender-based perspectives and gender training in a variety of peace-keeping and peace-
building programs.35 
 
To encourage implementation of UNSCR 1325, the Security Council has issued 
presidential statements to call on member states to develop national action plans or other 
national-level strategies.36 In addition to providing opportunities to identify priorities, develop 
strategies, and determine responsibilities and timeframes, the creation of national action plans 
(NAPs) offers a process for raising awareness and building capacity to address gaps and 
challenges in implementing Resolution 1325.37 A number of governments that are developing 
                                                          
1325 is legally binding, see Carol Cohn, Helen Kinsella & Sheri Gibbings, Women, Peace and Security: Resolution 
1325, 6 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 130 (2004). 
 
33 For example, the Resolution “[u]rges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-
making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, 
and resolution of conflict,” S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 1, ¶ 1 (emphasis omitted), and calls on negotiators of peace 
agreements to adopt “[m]easures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict 
resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements,” id. ¶ 8(b). 
UNSCR 1325 also encourages the UN Secretary-General “to appoint more women as special representatives and 
envoys;” to “expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations . . . especially 
among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;” and “to implement [the 
Secretary-General’s] strategic plan of action . . . calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-
making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes.” Id. ¶¶ 2-4. 
 
34 Id. ¶ 9. UNSCR 1325 urges all actors to adopt “[m]easures that ensure the protection of and respect for human 
rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the 
judiciary,” id. ¶ 8(c), as well as obligations under basic international human rights and humanitarian law treaties, id. 
¶ 9. The Resolution also calls for “special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, 
particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict.” Id. 
¶ 10. It further emphasizes “the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those 
responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other 
violence against women and girls, and . . . stresses the need to exclude these crimes . . . from amnesty provisions” in 
peace deals. Id. ¶ 11. 
  
35 In addition to expressing the Security Council’s “willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into 
peacekeeping operations,” the Resolution “urges the Secretary-General to ensure that . . . field operations include a 
gender component,” id. ¶ 5, and “to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, 
rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding measures,” id. ¶ 6. Additionally, UNSCR 1325 encourages “Member States to increase their 
voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts” carried out by various UN 
agencies. Id. ¶ 7.  
 
36 U.N. President of the S.C., Statement dated Oct. 28, 2004, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2004/40 (Nov. 2, 2004); U.N. 
President of the S.C., Statement dated Oct. 27, 2005, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/52 (Oct. 27, 2005). 
 
37  INTER-AGENCY NETWORK ON WOMEN & GENDER EQUAL., NAT’L IMPLEMENTATION OF SEC. COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 1325 (2000), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/national_level_impl.html.  
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NAPs to implement 1325 are “mainstreaming a gender perspective” into their training of military 
personnel and peacekeepers and into their development aid packages for post-conflict 
countries.38 
 
In a sense, Resolution 1325 planted the seeds for the all three theoretical frameworks for 
WPS discussed in this Article — the antisubordination, securitization, and democratic 
legitimation understandings. From an antisubordination standpoint, the preamble to 1325 stresses 
“the importance of [women’s] equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the 
maintenance and promotion of peace and security.”39 The securitization view is implicit in the 
same preambular paragraph, which “[r]eaffirm[s] the important role of women in the prevention 
and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building.”40 What I call a democratic legitimation 
account is also implicit in this paragraph, which emphasizes “the need to increase [women’s] 
role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution.”41 However, the 
primary rationale offered to support WPS has been the securitization framework, which relegates 
the goal of challenging the inequality and subordination women face in the field to a footnote. 
The democratic legitimacy account has been virtually absent. 
 
The rise of the securitization account in WPS mirrors the framework frequently used to 
advance women’s empowerment more broadly in international law and international affairs (as 
well as the realist approach to international relations more generally).  Women’s rights 
proponents, for example, increasingly rely on the “measurable and positive impact that women’s 
rising economic, social and political power has on the protection and promotion of the common 
good.”42 This trend is not limited to women’s rights advocates, though. Powerful male leaders — 
                                                          
 
38 Id. 
 
39 Supra note 1, ¶ 5 (emphasis added). 
 
40 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
41 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
42 See, e.g., Dorothy Q. Thomas, Women’s History Month Lecture at the League of Women Voters of Ozaukee 
Cty.,The W-Factor: Women, Power and American Progress 4 (Mar. 7, 2015) (on file with author). Thomas uses the 
expression the “W-Factor” to describe this phenomenon: “I don’t mean to imply that women are inherently the 
kinder, gentler sex and care more about others than do men. . . . I’ve seen individual women and men . . . abuse 
power with equal avidity. . . . [But] women, when organized collectively, inclusively, and transparently, tend as a 
group to act in a manner that favors all people’s equality and dignity and NOT only in our own so called ‘special 
interest.’” Id. at 7. 
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such as President Obama,43 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,44 and World Bank President 
Jim Kim45 — also justify women’s rights as a means of pursuing the common good.   
 
An important backdrop of the debate over women’s representation in peace and security 
is the broad, pioneering feminist critique of international law that Hilary Charlesworth, Christine 
Chinkin, and Shelley Wright wrote twenty-five years ago.46 Their claim that international law 
and institutions are infused with inherent gender biases — normatively, structurally, and in terms 
of representation — was nothing less than path-breaking and remains salient even as women 
make progress on the international stage.47 Faced with discrimination, violence, and other 
violations from state and non-state actors, women and girls in many parts of the world continue 
to face major obstacles to attending school, securing economic parity, and obtaining protection 
from forced marriage and trafficking, among other hardships. 
 
The Security Council responded to the emergence of feminist international law criticism 
and related developments in the 1990s48 by adopting Resolution 1325, the first in a series of 
resolutions49 in which the Council sought to address the underrepresentation of women and 
                                                          
43 See, e.g., PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, NAT’L SEC. STRATEGY 38 (2010) (“Experience shows that countries are 
more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full and equal rights and opportunity.”); see also 
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, NAT’L SEC. STRATEGY 20 (2015) (“Recognizing that no society will succeed if it does 
not draw on the potential of all its people, we are pressing for the political and economic participation of women and 
girls . . . .”)  
44 Secretary-General’s Remarks to Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security (Oct. 13, 2015) 
(noting that Resolution 1325 “underscored the pivotal link between gender equality and international peace and 
security”), http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=9134.  
 
45 See, e.g., Jim Kim, Remarks: Financing for Gender Equality – Results and Good Practices (July 1, 2015)  (“At the 
World Bank Group, we are finalizing a new gender strategy. A centerpiece of that plan will be developing and 
sharing knowledge about gender equality as a critical pathway to achieving our twin corporate goals: ending 
extreme poverty by 2030 and boosting shared prosperity.”). For additional commentary, see the 2012 World Bank 
Report, which largely focuses on the instrumental justification for gender equality as being “smart economics,” even 
while acknowledging that “[g]ender equality is a core development objective in its own right.” WORLD BANK, 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: GENDER EQUALITY AND DEVELOPMENT, at xx (2012). 
 
46 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM.  J. 
INT’L L. 613 (1991). 
 
47 See, e.g., NO CEILINGS, supra note 3 (discussing progress and remaining gaps in gender equality). 
  
48 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text. 
 
49 The Security Council adopted subsequent resolutions addressing women, peace and security concerns, as follows: 
S.C. Res. 1820 (June 19, 2008) (recognizing sexual violence in conflict as a matter of international security); S.C. 
Res. 1888 (Sept. 30, 2009) (providing mechanisms to strengthen the implementation of S.C. Res. 1820, including 
the appointment of a UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict); S.C. Res. 
1889 (Oct 5, 2009) (calling for further steps to address women’s participation, particularly in post-conflict planning 
and peace building); S.C. Res. 1960 (Dec. 16, 2010) (calling for additional monitoring and measures to address 
conflict-related sexual violence, including the deployment of more women in peacekeeping as well as more training 
for peacekeepers in gender-based and sexual violence); S.C. Res. 2106 (June 24, 2013) (addressing accountability 
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marginalization of gender concerns in peace and security. This Article explores claims about 
gender representation in the WPS field in two ways. On one level, it explores the claim that 
increasing the representation of women in developing peace agreements strengthens the 
sustainability of these agreements. On a deeper level, the Article examines the assumption 
underlying this claim: that the way women represent themselves — the way women “perform” 
— in matters of peace and security is different from the way men perform. Just as gender 
representation has been long debated in the context of U.S. domestic law on gender composition 
of leadership positions in corporations,50 on courts,51 and in government more generally,52 
                                                          
for perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict); S.C. Res. 2122 (Oct. 18, 2013) (addressing the persistent gaps in the 
implementation of the women, peace and security agenda); and S.C. Res. 2242 (Oct. 13, 2015) (addressing women’s 
roles in countering violent extremism and terrorism and recommending improvements in the Council’s and the UN’s 
own working methods in relation to women, peace and security). 
 
50 See, e.g., Jayne M. Barnard, More Women on Corporate Boards? Not So Fast, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
703 (2007); Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 
77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431 (2008); Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of 
Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363 (2002); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795; Donald J. Polden, 
Forty Years After Title VII: Creating an Atmosphere Conducive to Diversity in the Corporate Boardroom, 36 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 67 (2005). On racial diversity, see Sung Hui Kim, The Diversity Double Standard, N.C. L. REV. 
(2011); Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America’s 
Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583 (2004); cf. David B. Wilkins, From “Separate 
Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the 
Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548 (2004). 
 
51 See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on the Bench Mean for Justice?, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113 
(1999); Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein, & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010); Kate Malleson, Justifying Gender Equality on the Bench: Why Difference Won’t Do, 11 
FEM. LEG. STUD.  1 (2003); Patricia M. Wald, Six Not-So-Easy Pieces: One Woman Judge’s Journey to the Bench 
and Beyond, 36 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 979, 989 (2005); see also Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 2195 (1993). 
 
52 See, e.g., Steven Hill, Why Does the U.S. Still Have So Few Women in Office?, NATION (March 7, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/why-does-us-still-have-so-few-women-office/.  
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analogous questions are being raised in the fields of international law, comparative studies, and 
international organizations.53   
 
B. Why So Few Women? 
 
One study of 31 major peace processes between 1992 and 2011 found that only 9% of 
negotiators and 2% of chief mediators were women.54 Between 1990 and 2010, only 7% of 
agreements in which the UN was a third party referenced women.55 Rather than including 
women and other constituents who might pave the way to lasting peace, men from the warring 
parties often begin peace processes by granting amnesties to each other for rape and other sexual 
                                                          
53 For discussion of gender representation in international institutions, see, for example, Nienke Grossman, 
Shattering the Glass Ceiling in International Adjudication, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter 
Grossman, Shattering the Glass Ceiling]; Nienke Grossman, Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the 
Legitimacy of International Courts?, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 647 (2012) [hereinafter Grossman, Sex on the Bench]; 
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, supra note 7 (reflecting on and offering a conceptual framing for Professor Ní Aoláin’s own 
candidacy for a judgeship on the European Court of Human Rights); Gqual, The Current Composition of 
International Tribunals and Monitoring Bodies (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.gqualcampaign.org/1626-2/; and 
Viviana Kristicevic, Gqual Campaign for Gender Parity in International Representation (2015) (on file with 
author).   
 
For comparative discussion of gender representation in government and the question of quotas, see, for example, 
Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy, supra note 16 (discussing state and corporate quotas in Europe); and 
Isobel Coleman, Are Quotas for Women in Politics a Good Idea, ATLANTIC (Jan. 11, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/are-quotas-for-women-in-politics-a-good-idea/251237/ 
(discussing parliamentary quotas in the Middle East and North Africa).   
 
For comparative discussion of gender representation on corporate boards and the question of quotas, see, for 
example, Suk, supra; and Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More Than a Woman: Insights into Corporate 
Governance After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV.  889 (2015). 
 
54 UN WOMEN, WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN PRESENCE AND 
INFLUENCE 3 (2d ed. 2012).   
 
55 Christine Bell & Catherine O’Rourke, Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? The Impact of UNSC Resolution 
1325 on Peace Processes and their Agreements, 59 INT’L & COMP.  L. Q.  941, 957 (2010). According to a recent 
report commissioned by the UN, the number of references to gender in peace agreements increased after the 
adoption of Resolution 1325, particularly in processes supported by the UN itself:  
 
Between 1990 and 2000, when the Security Council adopted 1325, just 11 per cent of peace 
agreements signed included a reference to women. Since the adoption of resolution 1325, 27 per 
cent of peace agreements have referenced women. Of the six agreements resulting from peace 
talks or national dialogue processes supported by the UN in 2014, 67 per cent contained references 
relevant to women, peace and security. 
 
Coomaraswamy et al., supra note 15, at 14. 
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violence used as weapons of war — tantamount to “men with guns . . . forgiving other men with 
guns for crimes committed against women.”56  
 
Why is the underrepresentation of women in peacemaking important? By and large, 
women experience war differently from men and bring different perspectives to peace and 
security issues. These differences are largely socially constructed. The “hyper”-masculine57 
terrain of war “persists notwithstanding the [modest] increased presence of women in military 
forces both state and non-state.”58 While men comprise the majority of combatants and are more 
likely to be killed as a direct consequence of war, “[w]omen are more likely to die from war’s 
indirect effects after conflict ends — from causes relating to the breakdown in social order, 
human rights abuses, economic devastation, and the spread of infectious diseases.”59 Even aside 
from being the predominant targets of sexual violence that occurs during armed conflict, women 
experience domestic violence at higher rates during times of conflict.60 In fact, “levels of rape 
and domestic violence remain extremely high in postconflict settings, as demobilized fighters 
primed to use force confront transformed gender roles at home or the frustrations of 
unemployment.”61   
 
Despite the significance these different experiences could hold for formal peace 
processes, the peacemaking landscape has constructed multiple barriers to the participation of 
women. In reality, peacemaking reaches beyond the ceasefires and division of territory found in 
                                                          
56 Donald Steinberg, Peace Missions and Gender: Full Engagement of Women Holds the Key, OSCE MAGAZINE 12 
(July – Aug. 2009), http://www.osce.org/secretariat/37702?download=true. Note also that women are under-
represented in aspects of peacemaking at the international level – within UN Headquarters (for example, in the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs) as well in the field (for example, as 
peacekeepers on the ground). For a comprehensive picture, see Coomaraswamy et al., supra note 15. 
 
57 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Naomi Cahn, Gender, Masculinities, and Transition in Conflicted Societies, 44 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 101 (2009). 
 
58 Fionnuala D. Ní Aoláin, Advancing Women’s Rights in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations, 104 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 568, 570 (2010). 
 
59 MARIE O’REILLY, ANDREA Ó SÚILLEABHÁIN & THANIA PAFFENHOLZ, REIMAGING PEACEMAKING: WOMEN’S 
ROLE IN PEACE PROCESSES 5 (2015), https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/IPI-E-pub-Reimagining-
Peacemaking-rev.pdf; see also KATHLEEN KUEHNAST, CHANTAL DE JONGE OUDRAAT & HELGA HERNES, WOMEN 
AND WAR: POWER AND PROTECTION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2011); Thomas Pluemper & Eric Neumeyer, The 
Unequal Burden of War: The Effect of Armed Conflict on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy, 60 INT’L ORG. 723 
(2006). 
 
60 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT: PROMOTING GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT, 
(2007); Erin Mooney, The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally Displaced Persons as a 
Category of Concern, 24 REFUGEE SURVEY QUARTERLY (October 2005); Lori Heise & Claudia Garcia-Moreno, 
Violence by Intimate Partners, in WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 100 (Etienne G. Krug et al. eds., 
2002); Jose V. Gallegos & Italo A. Gutierrez, The Effect of Civil Conflict on Domestic Violence: The Case of Peru, 
(Working Paper, Aug. 3, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1904417.  
  
61 O’REILLY ET AL, supra note 59, at 5; see also JACQUI TRUE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 149 (2012). 
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formal agreements. Peacemakers need to also lay the foundation for post-conflict society and to 
shape its structures.62 However, for the most part, it is the belligerents who decide both the 
former and the latter, rather than those who worked for peace, did not take up arms, or “whose 
priorities for a peaceful society may [otherwise] differ.”63 This approach views the goal of a 
peace process as the end of violence, and thus women – who are rarely combatants — are not 
likely to be seen as relevant or legitimate participants. But if the objective is to build peace, then 
other relevant representatives in society—including women—and a broader timeline are 
necessary.64   
 
To understand why the peacekeeping landscape is so gendered, consider Christine Bell’s 
conceptualization of a three-stage process for peace negotiations to eliminate conflict: “pre-
agreement,” “framework,” and “implementation” phases.65 As Fionnuala Ní Aoláin reminds us, 
Resolution 1325 and subsequent Security Council resolutions broadly emphasize the formal 
framework phase of peace negotiations geared toward ending hostilities — a focus which ignores 
feminist insights “about the impact (generally negative) that informal legal processes have on 
women’s lives.”66 By focusing on the formal framework phase, such peace processes 
predominately emphasize “rehabilitation of the public political and legal spheres, thereby 
ignoring the private realm — and (re) entrenching a public/private divide in many post-conflict 
societies, the limitations of which feminists have long exposed.”67 While a goal of 
internationalizing peace processes has been to involve multilateral institutions and other states as 
a way of supporting indigenous women’s rights and other rule of law efforts, in practice 
internationalization can also serve to reinforce local biases.68 
 
The fact that most international interest is directed toward the “framework” agreement 
phase obscures the significance of deals made in the “pre”-agreement stage, such as ceasefire 
agreements and “in principle” agreements.69 While such agreements can deeply prefigure what 
will be included in eventual binding peace agreements (for example, by establishing facts on the 
ground), this phase “tends to be dominated by military actors and is deeply masculine in 
representation and culture.”70 Moreover, the rise in recognition of non-state actors in 
                                                          
62 O’REILLY ET AL, supra note 59, at 1.  
 
63 Id. 
 
64 Id. 
 
65 CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE LEX PACIFICATORIA (2008). 
  
66 Ní Aoláin, supra note 58, at 569. 
 
67 Id. See also Charlesworth et al., supra note 46.   
 
68 Ní Aoláin, supra note 58, at 569. 
 
69 Id. 
 
70 Id. See also Ní Aoláin et al., supra note 57. 
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international law has enlarged the role for non-state armed groups in the pre-agreement and other 
phases, even as the role of the UN has declined due to a shifting mediation landscape and 
proliferation of mediation organizations that have undercut the UN’s influence in implementing 
Resolution 1325.71 While governments resisted negotiating with non-state armed groups during 
the Cold War, with the growth in the number of civil wars in the 1990s and research on the 
positive effects of the inclusion of such non-state groups, their participation is now the “new 
normal.”72 Inclusion of unarmed non-state actors as the next paradigm shift could help secure 
buy-in from constituencies beyond the armed groups in conflict, “who themselves may have little 
legitimacy among the citizens.”73   
 
Yet even where the UN is able to exercise influence, parties to a conflict often face many 
competing demands, including the pressure of ending hostilities quickly, sometimes within short 
timeframes imposed by the UN Security Council itself. This pressure undermines efforts to take 
a more inclusive approach that could reach a broader set of participants.74 Plus, while Resolution 
1325 may have incrementally impacted the representation of women in formal peace 
negotiations, if the real work of peace has already occurred in the pre-agreement phase, then the 
presence of women may just obscure the fact that outcomes have been determined beforehand.75 
 
While the content of agreements may be determined in the framework phase of the 
formal model, the real content of peace agreements is frequently “diverted out from the formal 
negotiations context to the ‘implementation’ stage.”76 Formal agreements cannot flesh out all of 
the elements of reconstruction and reform — legal, political, economic, and social — that are 
necessary in a society emerging from violent conflict.77 Although diverse as a group, women 
often assert “different security needs and priorities for peace [that] challenge the dominant 
understanding of peace and security[,] which remains largely focused on state security” instead 
of human security.78   
 
If women are not engaged in the implementation phase, they cannot meaningfully 
participate in addressing the harms that women experience during conflict, including rape, other 
                                                          
71 See O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 7 (surveying scholarly discussion of “[t]he increased number of actors 
involved in mediation and a proportionally reduced role for the UN” and noting that terrorism and “militarized 
responses to violent extremism [have] clos[ed] the space for mediation in many parts of the world”). 
 
72 Id. at 8. 
 
73 Id. (parentheses omitted). 
 
74 Id. at 6. 
 
75 Ní Aoláin, supra note 58, at 569. 
 
76 Id. 
 
77 Id. 
 
78 O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 1. 
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forms of sexual assault, forced impregnation, the loss of family members, and expanded care 
responsibilities.79 Furthermore, when war ends, funder fatigue sets in for international donors, 
often leading to less funding for women’s groups and other civil society organizations in the 
post-conflict phase.80 This can “undercut the capacity for women either to hold the gains made in 
formal agreements, or advance the protections needed for women in this critical legal and 
political phase.”81 All in all, failure to account for the gendered nature of conflict at every stage  
has significant implications for the success of the transition from conflict to peace in general.  
Thus, greater account must be taken of “the impact of violent masculinities on disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration programs.”82   
 
In fact, “traditional gender dichotomies may be further entrenched and exacerbated during 
times of extreme violence,” and women are at risk of remaining “subordinated by dominant 
discourses that minimize or ignore [their] needs and views,” despite research demonstrating the 
relationship between a more inclusive approach and ending conflict.83 
 
C. The Relationship Between Women’s Participation and Prospects for Peace 
 
Deploying a mixed methodology, this Section examines new quantitative and qualitative 
work that investigates the relationship between women’s involvement in peacemaking and the 
prospects for securing sustainable peace. The research reflects that when women are selected — 
based on a broader notion of what constitutes relevant qualifications — their involvement is 
correlated with a greater likelihood of gender-sensitive outcomes and sustainable peace 
agreements, though causation remains unclear. 
 
While much of the writing on WPS has been primarily normative or based on more 
limited quantitative research, a recent report by the International Peace Institute (IPI)84 
summarizes both (1) new statistical research based on 182 peace agreements,85 and (2) a multi-
                                                          
79 Ní Aoláin, supra note 58, at 569. 
 
80 Catherine Powell, Women and Girls in the Afghanistan Transition 15 (Council on Foreign Relations, Working 
Paper, 2014) (noting cuts in U.S. funding to education in Afghanistan as the U.S. reduced its military presence in 
Afghanistan and the war there wound down); see also Emma Graham-Harrison, Afghan Educators Struggle for 
Funding as US Aid Budget Shrinks, GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/18/afghanistan-educators-funding-us-aid; Afghanistan: Military 
Drawdown Could Hit Aid Flows, IRIN, May 14, 2014 (noting a humanitarian worker observing that “[w]e saw a 
drop in humanitarian assistance in Iraq and Kosovo after the inter-national military forces withdrew”). 
 
81 Ní Aoláin, supra note 58, at 570. 
82 Supra note 57, at 101.  
83 Ní Aoláin, supra note 58, at 570. 
 
84 O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 10 (discussing methodology).   
85 Id. at 12-13 (summarizing the unpublished work of Laurel Stone, research associate for policy studies at 
University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies); id. at 34 (detailing Stone’s statistical 
analysis and methodology, based on a new dataset she created “that measures whether or not one or more women 
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year research project, involving forty in-depth case studies across regions and supported by 
interviews with experts directly involved in peace and security.86 The report confirms that not 
only do women and men “tend to experience conflict differently,” but “their priorities for peace 
frequently differ.”87 In fact, other studies also demonstrate that women are more likely than men 
to raise issues like human rights, justice, health, and employment in peace negotiations—issues 
that are important to sustainable peace.88   
 
Women often bring to the table issues that relate to human security. In emphasizing 
“positive” peace (or the “absence of structural violence”), women are expanding the traditional 
conception of “negative” peace (or “the absence of armed conflict . . . which prioritizes state 
security”).89 According to the research, this difference in perspective, as well as the mobilization 
work that women undertake based on this perspective, is correlated with a greater likelihood that 
peace agreements will be implemented.90 However, while this research lends support to the idea 
that women’s participation in peacemaking is correlated with more durable peace agreements, 
the data suffer from limitations and the case studies are incomplete.  
                                                          
participated in peace talks occurring between 1989 and 2011, using data from Uppsala University’s Peace 
Agreement Dataset, UN Women’s reports on women in peace processes, and multiple case studies”). For the 
dataset, see UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset v. 2.0, 1975-2011, 
www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_peace_agreement_dataset/. 
 
86 O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 10-12, 13-33 (summarizing the research of the Broadening Participation 
Project at the Graduate Institute of International Development Studies in Geneva, a project led by Thania 
Paffenholz); see also Main Results of ‘Broader Participation in Political Negotiations and Implementation’ Project 
2011–2015, GRADUATE INST. GENEVA (April 2015), 
http://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/292673/files/briefingpaperbroader%20participation.pdf.  
 
87 O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 61, at 6. 
 
88 See, e.g., INT’L CRISIS GROUP, BEYOND VICTIMHOOD: WOMEN’S PEACEBUILDING IN SUDAN, CONGO, AND 
UGANDA (2006), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/beyond-victimhood-womens-peacebuilding-
sudan-congo-and-uganda. 
 
89 O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 61, at 6.  The report notes: 
 
In fact, quantitative analysis shows that women’s security and positive peace are intertwined: … 
women’s physical security and gender equality in society correlate with broader peace and 
stability in states. While the causal direction remains unclear, quantitative analysis shows that 
women are more likely to face rape, domestic violence, and other physical threats in states with 
high rates of conflict, crime, and instability, and in those that have poor relations with their 
neighbors or with the international community. Similarly, states are less likely to be peaceful if 
their family laws favor men or gender discrimination is prevalent in practice, despite equality 
under the law.   
 
Id. (citing VALERIE HUDSON, BONNIE BALLIF-SPANVILL, MARY CAPRIOLI & CHAD F. EMMETT, SEX AND WORLD 
PEACE (2012)).  
 
90 Id. at 11 n.61 (“An agreement is defined as being fully implemented when at least 80 percent of its relevant 
provisions were implemented; an agreement is defined as partially implemented when at least some of the key 
provisions have been implemented.”). 
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1. Quantitative Analysis 
 
 The statistical data in the IPI report measure the participation of women as mediators, 
negotiators, witnesses, and signatories to 182 peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2011, 
as well as the duration of the peace achieved through those agreements.91 These data suggest that 
women’s participation has a statistically significant, positive correlation with the duration of 
peace.92 In the short run, when women were included in a peace process, the resulting peace 
agreement was twenty percent more likely to last at least two years.93 This percentage only 
increased over time, with such agreements proving thirty-five percent more likely to last for 
fifteen years.94  
 
 Surprisingly, the data also reflect that the inclusion of women’s rights language in peace 
agreements was negatively correlated with the duration of the peace agreement, suggesting that 
while such “gender-sensitive language may be valuable for advancing gender equality and 
reducing structural violence in society (and further research is needed in this regard), the 
inclusion of gender provisions alone will not contribute to sustaining the peace agreement.”95  
Other studies have focused on the inclusion of gender-sensitive language as a proxy for women 
improving the prospects for peace. The findings in this data, however, demonstrate “that gender 
provisions in a peace agreement should not be conflated with women’s participation in a peace 
process”96 without further exploration of the connection between the two. 
 
In an effort to control for other variables, the IPI study concedes that women’s 
participation was only one significant predictor of peace outcomes. Another variable was 
democracy, which also demonstrated a positive effect on the durability of peace agreements.97 In 
fact, since “[d]emocracy and women’s participation are often linked,” this result may indicate 
that “societal equality and good governance together encourage a lasting peace.”98 The study 
concedes that causation can move either way: “democracy could aid gender equality in a 
conflict-affected country or the presence of a woman could facilitate the inclusion of democratic 
principles in the agreement.”99   
                                                          
91 Id. at 12. 
 
92 Id.  
 
93 Id. at 34. 
 
94 Id.  
 
95 Id. at 13. 
 
96 Id.  
 
97 Id. at 34. 
 
98 Id.  
 
99 Id.  
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Overall, the quantitative analysis in the IPI report is illuminating and suggests there is a 
statistical correlation between women’s participation and durable peace. However, the study has 
a number of limitations. While women’s participation is correlated with more sustainable peace, 
causation has not been clearly demonstrated. Moreover, the study does not control for other 
significant factors, such as the presence of democracy. Additionally, the analysis “does not 
capture the number of women involved in each case nor what the extent of their involvement 
was.”100 To further examine the specific impact of women’s participation in peace processes on 
the durability of peace, the IPI study also provided results of a qualitative study. 
 
2. Qualitative Analysis 
 
Analyzing case studies of women’s participation helps to flesh out the dynamics behind 
the numbers. Studies of international institutions and mechanisms tend to foreground the “input” 
and “output” of these processes, and focus less on what actually goes on within them.101  
Comparative analysis of WPS has brought fresh attention to the operation of peace processes 
across the globe. 
 
The qualitative analysis in the IPI report involves a comparative case study approach 
based on examination of forty peace negotiations and political transitions and supported by 
interviews of individuals involved in peace processes in the countries examined.102 The project 
considers the impact of organized constituencies of women across negotiations, along with the 
impact of other distinct groups, including armed groups, political parties, and religious groups. 
Unlike the quantitative research, this qualitative study explores the impact of organized women’s 
groups, networks, or coalitions on peace or transition processes, as distinct from the role of 
individual women as negotiators and mediators, “since there is some evidence to suggest that 
women’s groups are more likely to raise concerns that are distinct from the belligerents’ 
priorities or specifically relevant to women.”103 The report assesses the impact of women’s 
participation in terms of both the quality and sustainability of peace agreements. For the 
purposes of the study, quality refers to the extent to which “the causes and effects of conflicts are 
addressed in the agreement.”104 Sustainability of peace agreements is understood as the extent to 
which “the provisions addressing these quality factors are implemented, and to what extent 
violence is reduced.”105 
 
                                                          
100 Id. 
 
101 Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations, 
53 INT’L ORG. 699, 701 (1999). 
 
102 O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 10-33. 
 
103 Id. at 10 (discussing the methodology). 
 
104 Id. 
 
105 Id. See also discussion supra note 90. 
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The project identified seven models of inclusion, listed here in decreasing order of direct 
involvement with the official peace process and with examples of successful case studies in 
brackets:   
 
(1) Direct participation at the negotiation table: direct involvement in official peace talks 
or in national dialogues on peacemaking, constitution making, or institutional reform 
[e.g., Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (Northern Ireland)]; 
 
(2) Observer status: a more informal mechanism, allowing selected groups to serve as 
communication conduits to a wider audience but without formal status [e.g., Mano River 
Women’s Peace Network (Liberia)]; 
 
(3) Consultations: allowing groups a broader sense of ownership over (and input into) the 
process but not allowing them to participate directly in the talks [e.g., Assembly of Civil 
Society’s interest group on women (Guatemala)]; 
 
(4) Inclusive commissions: established after peace agreements to implement major 
provisions on, for example, the constitution, transitional justice, and cease-fire 
monitoring [e.g., Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission’s gender quotas 
(Kenya)]; 
 
(5) Problem-solving workshops: provides a means for representatives close to leaders of 
conflicting parties to meet unofficially, without pressure to reach an agreement. This 
model rarely includes women, as proximity to decision makers is often key in selection 
[e.g., workshop to prepare 64 women for direct participation in the Inter-Congolese 
Political Negotiations (Democratic Republic of Congo)];  
 
(6) Public decision making: referenda and other elective mechanisms to put major political 
decisions to binding public votes [e.g., women’s groups’ essential role in building 
support for the referendum over the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 (Northern Ireland)]; 
 
(7) Mass action: campaigns, demonstrations, street action, protests, and petitions, which can 
support or oppose positions in peace negotiations [e.g., businesswoman spearheaded a 
group of likeminded business leaders, Sri Lanka First, and organized a massive 
demonstration with partner organizations that contributed significantly to pressure on 
political leaders to begin negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri 
Lanka)].106 
 
The case studies revealed several important lessons. First, women’s groups are more 
likely to contribute to sustainable peace where a combination of models of inclusion is used – not 
only by including women in formal negotiations, but also through other formal and informal 
                                                          
106 O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 1, 13-19; see also Thania Paffenholz, Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: 
Beyond the Inclusion-Exclusion Dichotomy, NEGOTIATION J.  69, 76-88 (2014). 
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mechanisms related to the peace process.107 To illustrate this point, the study contrasts two 
negotiation processes that spanned several decades in the Philippines. One negotiation – between 
the Philippine government and the communist-leaning National Democratic Front (NDF) – 
included women who were wives of NDF leaders but otherwise had little legitimacy 
participating as negotiators.108 The parties agreed to a 2011 Oslo Joint Statement that involved an 
unconventional instance of women’s involvement as direct participants at the negotiating table. 
In fact, the negotiations had the highest percentage of women delegates among a pool of thirty-
one major peace processes between 1992 and 2011, according to a study by UN Women.109 
However, after the signing of the Oslo Joint Statement, the talks stalled, partly due to disputes 
over security and immunity guarantees.110 Even though the NDF contended that it had committed 
to principles of gender representation in appointing representatives, critics argued that women 
were not, in fact, meaningful participants in the peace negotiations.111 The IPI study notes that 
“women nominated to a process to represent a particular conflict party may be unlikely to 
express the kinds of distinct and diverse perspectives on the process and the priorities for peace 
that women coming from other backgrounds have so often offered.”112 More broadly, the NDF’s 
team of representatives included male “leaders” who, while known to the government, were no 
longer viewed as having legitimacy or power in the eyes of most NDF members. Thus, the 
process “lacked buy-in from key constituencies and spoilers, and had limited influence over the 
NDF’s operations on the ground.”113   
 
By contrast, another negotiation – between the Philippine government and the Muslim-
separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – included both direct participation of women 
in negotiations and participation of women as observers in a national dialogue, a transition 
commission, and through mass action. On either side of the table, the women representatives 
“had both technical qualifications and extensive experience as civil society advocates who led 
mass action groups and campaigns,” and they were able to secure additional roles for women, 
both in the formal process and more inclusive platforms.114 According to participants in the talks, 
when women played leadership roles in discussing particular issues, there were new dynamics in 
the talks, as well as a stronger push to bring in more women representatives on the MILF side of 
                                                          
107 See O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 26.   
 
108 Id. at 20-21 (citing INT’L CIVIL SOC’Y ACTION NETWORK, NEGOTIATING A BETTER PEACE: WOMEN AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY AT THE TABLE (2014), http://www.icanpeacework.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/full-CN-FINAL.pdf).  
  
109 UN WOMEN, supra note 54, at 7 (cited in O’REILLY ET AL. supra note 59, at 20 n.107). 
 
110 O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 61, at 20. 
  
111 Id.  
 
112 Id. at 20-21. 
  
113 Id. at 21 (citing Interview by Marie O’Reilly and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin with Irene Santiago, in N.Y. (Sept. 25, 
2014)). 
  
114 Id. at 23. 
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the table. Women on both sides worked together to ensure gender equality guarantees in the 
agreement.115 A Comprehensive Agreement was reached in 2014, and “[t]he adopted text 
includes several clauses that promote gender equality and women’s participation in public 
life.”116 
 
Despite the record number of women representatives involved in the earlier peace process 
in the Philippines, its relative lack of success reflects the fallacy of thinking that merely 
increasing the number of women participants will, on its own, produce a better or more durable 
agreement. As the IPI study concludes, “merely involving more female participants at the peace 
table is no substitute for women’s influential participation,” as “women’s participation alone 
cannot overcome larger legitimacy issues, if those at the peace table are not accepted as 
representatives by their own constituencies.”117   
 
A second lesson from the IPI report’s qualitative analysis is that when individual women 
are selected to participate in formal negotiations on behalf of one of the conflicting parties, they 
may not represent the interests of women more broadly or have a positive effect on securing an 
agreement. By contrast, when women are selected based on qualifications that include past work 
in peace or leadership of constituencies of women, they are more likely to push for peace 
agreements with broader buy-in and legitimacy, enhancing the sustainability of the agreements. 
Women’s involvement is also more likely to secure women’s rights, leading to even greater 
peace and prosperity and creating a virtuous circle. This contrast is demonstrated by the two 
different negotiations in the Philippines described above.  
 
A third lesson is that, at least when they are represented in small numbers, women’s 
influence is far reduced in deliberative processes based on majority rule.118 By contrast, a 
consensus model enhances the influence women can exert.119 But the risk of “gender capture”120 
is frequently present, given the fact that men are predominant in positions of power within 
organizational structures, both historically and currently. 
 
                                                          
115 Id. (quoting Interview by N-Peace Network with Miriam Coronel-Ferrer (Oct. 27, 2014)).  
  
116 Id. at 23-24. For further information on the Philippines case study, see PATTY CHANG ET AL., GEO. INST. FOR 
WOMEN, PEACE, AND SEC., WOMEN LEADING PEACE 70 (2015); Anne Marie Goetz & Rob Jenkins, Taking Stock: 
Protection Without Empowerment: The Evolution of Women, Peace, and Security Since the Beijing Platform for 
Action, in WOMEN AND GIRLS RISING 68, 77 (Ellen Chestler & Terry McGovern eds., 2015) (noting the large role 
women in the Philippines played in resolving the conflict and in post-conflict institutions). 
  
117 O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 21. 
  
118 Id. at 29.  
 
119 KARPOWITZ & MENDELBERG, supra note 12 (noting that efforts to increase and improve the representation of 
women will often fall short unless they also address institutional rules that impede women’s voices). 
 
120 Ann Marie Goetz, Gender Justice, Citizenship and Entitlements: Core Concepts, Central Debates and New 
Directions for Research, in GENDER JUSTICE, CITIZENSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT 16 (Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay & 
Navsharan Singh eds., 2007). 
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A fourth lesson is that women are more likely to assist in building sustainable peace 
when there are robust women’s coalitions with expertise in peace, human rights, and bridging 
sectarian and other divides.121 This was clearly demonstrated by the contrast between the two 
peace processes in the Philippines, where such women’s coalitions were active in the 
negotiations with MILF. 
 
Overall, the lessons drawn from the qualitative research indicate that the participation of 
individual women in itself may not necessarily impact peace processes. The Philippines case 
study in particular demonstrates that merely having women at the negotiating table does not by 
itself produce a higher-quality or more durable agreement. Women participants must have 
influence and experience, and the structure of their participation must ensure meaningful input.  
 
II. Existing Theoretical Frames 
 
As has been the case in debates about gender representation in U.S. law, women’s 
participation in the development of peace agreements has been justified by both moral and 
instrumentalist accounts of equality theory. The prevailing views in the WPS debate are what I 
refer to as an antisubordination (or moral) account and a securitization (or instrumentalist) 
account. 
 
This Part draws on literature concerning gender representation – both in the WPS context 
and more broadly – to investigate the antisubordination and securitization accounts of women’s 
participation in peacemaking. For each account, this Part explores (1) the ways the theoretical 
framework justifies increasing women’s participation, as well as (2) the shortcomings of the 
account.   
 
A. Antisubordination Account 
 
1. The Rationale 
 
The antisubordination account in support of women’s participation in peace negotiations 
posits that their participation is morally justified as a matter of equality, fairness, human dignity, 
and challenging male dominance. Often invoked in contrast to the anticlassification (or color-
blind/gender-blind/formal equality) principle, the antisubordination principle provides a 
substantive account of equality, which “contend[s] that guarantees of equal citizenship cannot be 
realized under conditions of pervasive social stratification and argue[s] that law should reform 
institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed 
groups.”122 As outlined by Owen Fiss and subsequent scholars in U.S. constitutional law, the 
                                                          
121 O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 59, at 14, 23, 26 (discussing Northern Ireland and the Philippines as successful 
models and distilling lessons learned overall). 
 
122 Balkin & Siegel, supra note 14, at 9. By contrast, the anticlassification principle asserts that the government may 
not formally classify people – either explicitly or surreptitiously – on the basis of a forbidden category such as race 
or gender, but fails to adequately address de facto or secondary generation discrimination. Id. 
 
12.21.16 draft HOW WOMEN COULD SAVE THE WORLD 
 
27 
 
antisubordination concept “is variously called the antisubordination principle, the antisubjugation 
principle, the equal citizenship principle, or the anticaste principle.”123   
 
Catharine MacKinnon and other scholars have adapted antisubordination theory in the 
context of global sex equality. In a recent paper, Sex Equality in Global Perspective, MacKinnon 
expands her earlier work on gender hierarchy globally.124 After noting that U.S. law “remains 
mired” and “in the grip of . . . [t]raditional formal equality theory, predicated on Aristotle’s 
formulation [of] treating ‘likes alike, unlikes unalike,’” she argues that this sameness/difference 
approach is “more tenacious elsewhere than is usually recognized, predominating legally within 
most nations.”125  While formal equality requires that women prove they are “similarly situated” 
to men to secure equality to men, MacKinnon notes that is it precisely those women who are 
most unlike powerful men who are most in need of equality law’s protection.126 In contrast to 
formal equality, then, MacKinnon’s account of substantive equality “aims to eliminate systemic 
patterns of group advantage and disadvantage—i.e. hierarchies of social dominance and 
subordination.”127 
 
As applied to WPS, an antisubordination framework calls for a deep account of gender 
equality and cautions against the lingering effects of patriarchy in, for example, the gender 
stratification of combat. Such an account destabilizes traditional assumptions about 
qualifications for peace negotiations by recognizing that the qualifications themselves have been 
developed through the lens of men and clouded by standards which themselves are informed by 
male-influenced notions of power and worth. As discussed above, when combatants are the 
primary negotiators, participants will be predominantly, if not exclusively, men. Beyond the 
military, men continue to dominate in other institutions of powers, so negotiators drawn from a 
                                                          
123 Id. (citing DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); 
KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989); CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32-45 (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 117 (1979) (arguing that courts 
should inquire “whether the policy or practice integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a 
deprived position because of gender status”); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 16-21, at 
1043-52 (1st ed. 1978); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987)). 
 
124 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex Equality in Global Perspective (Oct. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author) (extending globally her earlier work on gender hierarchy, developed originally in the context of 
U.S. sex equality law, in, for example, MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 123). 
 
125 MacKinnon, Sex Equality in Global Perspective, supra note 124, at 1-2 (emphasis added) (citing 3 ARISTOTLE, 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 1131a-1131b, 112-17 (J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson eds., David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1980); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Gender in Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 397 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012)); see also ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 307 
(Benjamin Jowett trans., 1943) (“Equality consists in the same treatment of similar persons . . . .”). 
 
126 See generally MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 123 (critiquing formal equality and theorizing a 
new approach to equality based on the idea that gender relations are founded on structures of dominance and 
subordination). 
 
127 MacKinnon, Sex Equality in Global Perspective, supra note 124, at 2. 
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pool of political or other leaders (traditionally defined) will also be predominantly men. Yet, 
when women are selected based on broader notions of what constitute qualifications, strong 
women negotiators can be identified through their past work in peace or leadership with 
constituencies of women—qualities recognized as valuable in securing sustainable peace 
agreements with broader buy-in and legitimacy.128    
  
 In the context of WPS, the antisubordination approach draws on international human 
rights law, which embraces equality as a foundational right and turns on the assumption that we 
all have equal rights “in equal measure.”129 Emphasizing the human rights (and by association, 
antisubordination) approach, a recently released UN-commissioned global study on the 
implementation of Resolution 1325 insists that WPS should “always be interpreted within the 
framework of international human rights,”130 noting the role of women’s human rights. Of 
particular relevance to the antisubordination approach, the human rights framework encourages 
states to take affirmative action to promote equality,131 and defines “discrimination against 
women” to include de facto, not only de jure, discrimination.132 Rather than exclusively apply a 
formal equality approach, international human rights law advances the substantive equality 
approach advocated by antisubordination theorists. However, for the most part, United States 
constitutional law takes a more formal approach to equality.133 
 
2. Critiques 
 
a) The Formal Equality Challenge 
 
Critics of the antisubordination account of WPS call for a formal approach to equality 
and argue that claims for greater representation of women in peacemaking are inconsistent with 
the formal equality ideal that justice should be blind to gender, color, and other markers of 
difference. In contrast, the antisubordination approach argues that justice has never been blind, 
and that affirmative steps are necessary to include women in peace processes, even if those 
women are differently situated than men, as, for example, where women have not had a direct 
                                                          
128 See supra Section I.C.2. 
 
129 LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1-3 (1990) (tracing the foundations of the contemporary human rights idea 
and noting that it draws inspiration directly from the notions of inalienability and all men being created equal 
contained in the American Declaration of Independence). The human rights idea itself is based on the notion that 
each of us has certain inalienable rights, simply by virtue of our humanity—underscoring the related concept of 
equality in rights. Id at 2. 
 
130 Coomaraswamy et al., supra note 15, at 394. 
 
131 See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) arts. 4 & 5., 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. Cf.  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) arts. 1(4) & 2(2), Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
 
132 See CEDAW art. 1; see also CERD art. 1 (defining discrimination similarly for race). 
 
133  See Suk, Quotas and Consequences, supra note 16, at 231-33 (summarizing several major U.S. Supreme Court 
equality law cases). 
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role in a conflict as combatants. By rejecting the substantive equality notion that affirmative 
action is required to address past and continuing wrongs and structural inequality, however, 
formal equality requires that women prove they are similarly situated to men with whom they 
seek equal treatment, rather than be held to a different (presumably “lower”) standard. Because 
women are often excluded from combat positions and are underrepresented in prestigious 
military and political institutions from which peace negotiators are drawn, women are often not 
as “qualified” to serve in peace negotiations from a formal equality perspective, and “lowering” 
the bar to include women represents unfair “preferential treatment”134 that caters to special 
interests. 
 
Therefore, opponents of the antisubordination account of WPS view the inclusion of 
women as peace negotiators as an impermissible “quota.”135 Such opponents draw on the belief 
that quotas undermine the moral worth of individuals and divide society.136 For instance, 
Alexander Bickel argued that a racial quota “derogates the human dignity and individuality of all 
to whom it is applied; it is invidious in principle as well as in practice.”137 Similarly, from the 
standpoint of such critics—as reflected by the skepticism of some of the Justices on the U.S. 
Supreme Court—“quotas are thought to reduce individuals to morally irrelevant groups, in 
contrast with forms of consideration that take the unique traits of each person into account.”138 
 
b) The Challenge of Politics and Bureaucracy 
 
Even putting to one side the philosophical and legal opposition to antisubordination 
arguments for WPS, political and bureaucratic obstacles remain. As Hillary Clinton’s claim that 
women’s empowerment is not only the right thing to do, but the “smart” thing to do suggests, it 
is not enough to argue that promoting women’s rights is good in and of itself.139 In fact, the very 
strategy Clinton used as Secretary of State to prioritize gender in foreign policy relied heavily on 
the argument that empowering women was “smart” policy.140 Secretary Clinton realized that, in 
order to gain support for women’s empowerment within an otherwise male-centered, sclerotic 
foreign policy establishment, she would need to reframe women’s rights as a means of advancing 
                                                          
134 But see Harris & Narayan, supra note 17 (challenging the notion that affirmative action is preferential treatment, 
because preference is built into the system, so the baseline is not neutral). 
  
135 O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 61, at 22 (quoting Interview by Marie O’Reilly and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin with 
Irene Santiago, in N.Y. (Sept. 25, 2014)). 
 
136 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975) (criticizing the quota because of “its 
effect; a quota is a divider of society, a creator of castes”).  
 
137 Id. 
 
138  Suk, Quotas and Consequences, supra note 16, at 231 (characterizing this objection and summarizing the major 
affirmative action cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 
139 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
  
140 See Powell, Gender Indicators in Global Governance, supra note 6, at 168.  
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peace and prosperity.141 Some observers have described this as the “Hillary Doctrine”142 and 
noted that it emerged early on in her tenure as Secretary of State. For example, in a TEDWomen 
Conference in December 2010, Clinton declared, “The subjugation of women is . . . a threat to 
the common security of our world and to the national security of our country.”143     
 
Secretary Clinton embedded this principle in the inaugural Quadrennial Diplomacy and 
Development Review—a strategic plan she initiated for the State Department and USAID—
which weaves gender equality into almost all of its policy prescriptions, stating, for example, that 
“[t]he status of the world’s women is not simply an issue of morality—it is a matter of national 
security.”144 Toward the end of her term as Secretary of State, Clinton issued gender policy 
guidance on mainstream women’s issues throughout the State Department, its embassies, and its 
posts, noting: “Countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full and 
equal rights and opportunity.”145 On WPS specifically, Clinton’s gender guidance asserts that “a 
growing body of evidence shows that women bring a range of unique experiences and 
contributions in decision-making on matters of peace and security that lead to improved 
outcomes in conflict prevention and resolution.”146   
 
                                                          
141 See Suzanne Nossel, A Feminist Foreign Policy: Hillary Clinton’s Hard Choices, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar./Apr. 
2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2016-02-15/feminist-foreign-policy (reviewing 
VALERIE M. HUDSON & PATRICIA LEIDL, THE HILLARY DOCTRINE: SEX AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (2015), 
and describing one of the obstacles Clinton faced in advancing women’s rights in the State Department as the 
“sclerosis of the U.S. policymaking bureaucracy and the opposition and indifference of foreign governments”).  
 
142  The notion of a “Hillary Doctrine” was perhaps first introduced by Gayle Tzemach Lemmon. See Gayle 
Tzemach Lemmon, The Hillary Doctrine, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2011), http://mag.newsweek.com/2011/03/06/the-
hillary-doctrine.html; Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, The Hillary Doctrine: Women’s Rights Are a National Security 
Issue, ATLANTIC (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/04/the-hillary-doctrine-womens-
rights-are-a-national-security-issue/274770; see also HUDSON & LEIDL, supra note 141.  
 
143 Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks at the TEDWomen Conference (Dec. 8, 2010), 
http://m.state.gov/md152671.htm; see Micah Zenko, Book Review – “The Hillary Doctrine: Sex & American 
Foreign Policy,” COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 24, 2015), http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2015/06/24/book-review-
the-hillary-doctrine-sex-american-foreign-policy (noting that the “Hillary Doctrine” stems from Clinton’s 
TEDWomen Conference remarks and explaining that, “[i]n countries where women are chronically mistreated, or 
systematically excluded from leadership roles, there tends to be far greater state fragility, outbreaks and 
reoccurrences of conflict, and environments where extremists can flourish, including even terrorist organizations”).  
 
144 Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, U.S. DEP’T 
STATE 23 (2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153108.pdf.  
 
145 U.S. Dep’t of State Policy Guidance: Promoting Gender Equality to Achieve Our National Security and Foreign 
Policy Objectives, U.S. DEP’T STATE 1 (Mar. 2012), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/189379.pdf   
(summarizing internal Department policy guidance in a fact sheet).  
  
146 Id. Clinton further notes: 
Evidence shows that investments in women’s employment, health, and education are correlated with 
greater economic growth and more successful development outcomes. Engaging women as political and 
social actors can change policy choices and makes institutions more representative and better performing. 
Id. 
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Paradoxically, Hillary Clinton has been a long-time proponent of the antisubordination 
approach. For example, in her watershed 1995 speech in Beijing at the United Nations’ Fourth 
World Conference on Women, Clinton pronounced that “human rights are women’s rights . . . 
and women’s rights are human rights.”147 But by the fifteenth anniversary of the Beijing 
Conference, in a UN Security Council session on WPS that Secretary of State Clinton herself 
chaired in 2010 (for the tenth anniversary of UNSCR 1325), she declared: 
 
Now, women’s participation . . . is not [merely] a “nice thing to do.” . . . This is a 
necessary global security imperative. Including women in the work of peace 
advances our national security interests, promotes political stability, economic 
growth, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.148 
 
Perhaps more than any other opinion maker, Hillary Clinton helped shift the debate over 
WPS from an antisubordination framework to a securitization one. 
 
B. The Securitization Account 
 
1. The Rationale 
 
Following in the vein popularized by Hillary Clinton, the securitization account supports 
women’s participation in peace negotiations based on the claim that it enhances the prospects for 
peace and deeper security.149 Multilateral organizations, governments, and NGOs alike primarily 
rely on this rationale. For example, the most recent UN Security Council resolution on WPS, 
Resolution 2242, celebrates “the substantial link between women’s meaningful involvement in 
efforts to prevent, resolve and rebuild from conflict and those efforts’ effectiveness and long-
term sustainability . . . .”150 In implementing the initial resolution, Resolution 1325, the Obama 
Administration adopted a National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace, and Security, which 
asserts that its goal of empowering “half the world’s population as equal partners in preventing 
conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence, and insecurity . 
. . is critical to our national and global security.”151 The United States’ NAP squarely makes the 
                                                          
147 Hillary Rodham Clinton, First Lady of the United States, Remarks for the United Nations Fourth World 
Conference on Women (Sept. 5, 1995), http://www.un.org/esa/gopher-data/conf/fwcw/conf/gov/950905175653.txt.  
 
148 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks at the 10th Anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 
1325 on Women, Peace and Security (Oct. 26, 2010), http://usun.state.gov/remarks/4843 (quoting President 
Obama’s National Security Strategy, noting its recognition that “countries are more peaceful and prosperous when 
women are accorded full and equal rights and opportunity. When those rights and opportunities are denied, countries 
lag behind”). 
 
149 See generally CHANG ET AL., supra note 116. 
 
150 S.C. Res. 2242, preambular ¶ 7 (Oct. 15, 2005). 
 
151 UNITED STATES NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY 1 (Dec. 2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/email-
files/US_National_Action_Plan_on_Women_Peace_and_Security.pdf .  
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instrumentalist claim: “Deadly conflicts can be more effectively avoided, and peace can be best 
forged and sustained, when women become equal partners in all aspects of peace-building and 
conflict prevention, when their lives are protected, their experiences considered, and their voices 
heard.”152 
 
Leading NGO advocates and think tanks have advanced this consequentialist rationale as 
well. As one of the early WPS advocates, Ambassador Swanee Hunt, says: “Around the globe, 
women play a vital but often unrecognised role in averting violence and resolving conflict.”153 
Another prominent women’s rights advocate, Ambassador Melanne Verveer, the Director of the 
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, makes a similar claim. Having served as 
the Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
Verveer asserts: “Research shows that more inclusive peace processes lead to longer-term 
peace.”154 
 
At an even broader level, the securitization account’s claim is that women’s 
empowerment leads to greater prosperity and in turn greater peace and less conflict, violence, 
and extremism.155 Investments in sex equality are said to foster economic growth and reduce 
poverty, thereby addressing root causes of conflict, violence and extremism. Not only do women 
pay increased earnings forward into their families and communities, but empowering women 
also has a multiplier effect because better-educated women who earn more have fewer, healthier, 
and better-educated children.156 These children, in turn, have greater opportunities and are 
therefore less likely to turn to violence and extremism, and more likely to support more moderate 
societies.157   
                                                          
152 Id. 
 
153 Swanee Hunt, Moving Beyond Silence: Women Waging Peace, in LISTENING TO THE SILENCES: WOMEN AND 
WAR 251, 251 (Helen Durham & Tracey Gurd eds., 2005) (“With expertise in grassroots activism, political 
leadership, investigative journalism, human rights law, military reform, formal and information negotiations, 
transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction, these women bring new approaches to the security sphere 
process.”). 
 
154 Melanne Verveer, Where Women Are Leading the Peace, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/30/where-women-are-leading-the-peace-security.  
  
155 See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 153, at 251; Allison Peters, Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Pakistan: 
Why Policewomen Must Have a Role, INST. FOR INCLUSIVE SEC. 2 (Mar. 31, 2014), 
https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IIS-Pakistan-Memo-v5c-web.pdf  (“Policewomen 
improve the operational effectiveness of these forces by building trust with local communities, more effectively de-
escalating violence, and collecting vital intelligence that men could not.”). 
 
156 For a discussion many of the broad trends cited here, see, for example, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra 
note 45, at 11. For a somewhat skeptical take on the way the data is formulated and used, see Powell, Gender 
Indicators as Global Governance, supra note 6.  
 
157 See, e.g., Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka & Radhika Coomaraswamy, Women are the Best Weapon in the War 
Against Terrorism, Foreign Policy , Feb. 10, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/10/women-are-the-best-
weapon-in-the-war-against-terrorism/. The current spike in unemployed young people is particularly prevalent in 
parts of the world that experience conflict and extremism. 
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In the context of peace negotiations specifically, Ambassador Swanee Hunt argues that 
women are more connected to “community priorities,”158 which prompts them to bring different 
experiences to the peace table. Where women have a grounding in community networks and 
organizations, women in peace negotiations are more likely than men to raise issues pertaining to 
human security, such as human rights, justice, health, and employment. These issues are 
important to long-term stability, and addressing them bridges differences across sectarian and 
cultural divides.159 Moreover, one recent report that drew on more than 100 in-country 
interviews found that women were able to leverage their interpersonal and professional skills as 
well as their personal connections to advance stability and peace.160 Is it possible that the 
ongoing marginalization that women face in the formal labor market actually empowers them as 
community leaders? Ambassador Hunt notes: “Ironically, women’s status as second-class 
citizens is a source of empowerment, since it has made women adept at finding innovative ways 
to cope with problems.”161 She also points to social science research indicating that women are 
more collaborative than men, and that such collaboration leads to conflict resolution.162   
 
2. Critiques 
 
a) Methodological Challenges 
 
There are several methodological problems with the empirical research that underlies the 
securitization account of WPS. First, the data linking women’s participation to more durable 
peace agreements does not necessarily show causation, only correlation. Furthermore, there are 
likely endogeneity problems. For example, as the quantitative study discussed in Part I.C.1. itself 
conceded, other significant factors, such as the presence of democracy, are often hard to parse 
out from women’s participation. Democratic countries may be likely to have women negotiate 
peace agreements and may produce more stable peace agreements independent of women’s 
                                                          
158 Hunt, supra note 20. 
 
159 INT’L CRISIS GROUP, BEYOND VICTIMHOOD: WOMEN’S PEACEBUILDING IN SUDAN, CONGO AND UGANDA (June 
28, 2006), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/112-beyond-victimhood-women-s-peacebuilding-in-sudan-congo-
and-uganda.pdf. 
 
160 CHANG ET AL., supra note 116, at 11. 
  
161 Hunt & Posa, supra note 19, at 41.   
 
162 See, e.g., id.; see generally LANI GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MERITOCRACY: DEMOCRATIZING HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN AMERICA (2015) (applying Bear and Woolley in advancing a claim about the benefits of women and 
collaboration); see also Julia B. Bear & Anita Williams Woolley, The Role of Gender in Team Collaboration and 
Performance, 36 INTERDISC. SCI. REVS. 146 (2011) (demonstrating through social science research that women are 
more collaborative).  
 
These types of arguments supporting women’s participation echo those made in support of diversity on corporate 
boards. For example, Darren Rosenblum and Daria Roithmayr note that because women are “more likely to be 
outsiders” on corporate boards, adding women draws on a wider range of expertise, which benefits corporate 
decision making. Rosenblum et al., supra note 53, at 889. 
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participation. Moreover, the least stable agreements are likely to be the ones worked out by 
parties that have recently been at war, and those are the ones most likely to involve military 
negotiators. So, recent hot warfare leads to negotiations dominated by prior male combatants 
rather than civilian women; combatants’ presence may independently lead to a higher likelihood 
of renewed warfare–a fact that correlates with gender, but does not necessarily prove that 
underrepresentation of women is responsible for a peace agreement being less durable. 
A final methodological problem is that gaining access to data in conflict situations–and 
accessing gender-disaggregated data in many parts of the world–can be quite challenging.  
Women and girls are often under-counted in data-gathering exercises, and male-biased surveys 
often fail to capture women’s participation, perspectives, and value.163 When the data pool is 
small, it is difficult to draw reliable conclusions from quantitative analysis.  
b) The Anti-Essentialist Challenge: Women Are Not Always Doves 
 
Beyond the methodological challenges in the empirical research, the assumption that 
women bring different values or experiences to the peace table—while perhaps often true—is 
overly essentialist164 and not universally accurate. Not all women are “peace-loving,” and several 
women leaders have been hawkish on military matters. Margaret Thatcher and Golda Meir were 
strong, hawkish women leaders. As a senator, Hillary Clinton voted to support George W. 
Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and, as Secretary of State, she (along with Susan Rice and 
Samantha Power) supported U.S. intervention in Libya in opposition to Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates and other members of the military establishment.165   
 
In a sense, it is hard to gauge how hawkish or dove-ish individual women are based only 
on their support for or opposition to military intervention. For instance, because Hillary Clinton 
had her eye on higher office and was undoubtedly aware that women are perceived as “weak,” 
she may have overplayed the hawk card in her Iraq vote to demonstrate her “toughness” as a 
potential future president. In Israel, too, women politicians sometimes overcompensate with 
hawkish stances to counteract social perceptions of women as peace-loving.166 On the other 
                                                          
163 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Closing the Gender Data Gap: How Efforts to Collect Data About Women and 
Girls Drive Global Economic and Social Progress, N.Y. TIMES, http://paidpost.nytimes.com/gates-
foundation/closing-the-gender-data-gap.html. 
 
164 For a groundbreaking early critique of gender essentialism, see Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in 
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). 
 
165 See, e.g., John Avlon, Libya Airstrikes: The Women Who Called for War, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 20, 2011, 7:50 
PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/20/libya-airstrikes-hillary-clinton-and-the-women-who-called-
for-war.html; Jacob Heilbrunn, America’s Foreign Policy Valkyries: Hillary Clinton, Samantha Power, and Susan 
Rice, NAT’L INTEREST (Mar. 21, 2011), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/jacob-heilbrunn/americas-foreign-policy-
valkyries-hillary-clinton-samantha-p-5047; see also Jo Becker & Scott Shane, The Libya Gamble, Part I: Hillary 
Clinton, ‘Smart Power’ and a Dictator’s Fall, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/hillary-clinton-libya.html.  
 
166 See, e.g., YAEL YISHAI, LAND OR PEACE: WHITHER ISRAEL? 179-181 (1987) (explaining how Israeli women 
overcompensate for their lower societal status and perceived femininity by taking stronger stances on security than 
Israeli men); YAEL YISHAI, BETWEEN THE FLAG AND THE BANNER: WOMEN IN ISRAELI POLITICS 107-109 (2012). I 
would like to thank my colleague Jed Shugarman for flagging this phenomenon. 
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hand, since the women who are most likely to rise to the top in political and military institutions 
are women who can succeed in a “man’s world,” it should not surprise if these women really are 
more hawkish. Thus, the problem with the securitization framework is that while it calls for 
women’s leadership—and anticipates that women will promote peace—it is not clear that the 
women who will step forward (or be selected) to lead will “perform” gender in the ways the 
securitization account anticipates. 
 
Additional evidence that women have the potential to orient toward militarism as they 
gain equality with men includes: the Supreme Court’s recognition that women should not be 
excluded from historically all-male military academies,167 the Obama Administration’s decision 
to drop the combat ban on women serving in the U.S. military,168 and the inclusion of women in 
the Special Forces.169   
 
A further indication that not all women are peaceniks is the militarization of feminism, 
reflected in, for example, the calls by prominent feminist Eleanor Smeal for an ongoing U.S. 
military presence in Afghanistan to support the women’s rights.170 Furthermore, women have 
                                                          
  
167 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  
  
168 See, e.g., P.J. Tobia, Defense Secretary Carter Opens All Combat Jobs to Women, PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 3, 
2015, 11:41 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/watch-live-defense-secretary-carter-to-lift-ban-on-
women-in-combat-jobs.  
 
169 See generally GAYLE TZEMMACH LEMMON, ASHLEY’S WAR (2015). 
 
170 See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Gail Tzemach Lemmon & Hannah Chartoff, Safe Enough to Thrive, MS. MAGAZINE 
(May 12, 2015), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2015/05/12/afghanistans-women-safe-enough-to-thrive (quoting 
Eleanor Smeal’s support for an ongoing military presence in Afghanistan); see also Karen Engle, “Calling in the 
Troops”: The Uneasy Relationship Among Women’s Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention, 20 
HARV. HUM. RTS. L. J. 189 (2007) (urging reconsideration of humanitarian intervention as an emerging norm where 
women’s rights are concerned, and using as examples debates over rape constituting acts of genocide in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Darfur, Sudan); Catherine Powell, Mr. Ghani Goes to Washington, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.: 
WOMEN AROUND THE WORLD (Mar. 21, 2015), http://blogs.cfr.org/women-around-the-world/2015/03/27/mr-ghani-
goes-to-washington (responding to President Obama’s announcement that he would delay the drawdown of U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan, and cautioning against the trend toward militarizing women’s human rights, when diplomacy 
and soft power may be more effective and sustainable, less costly, and more protective of American and Afghan 
lives). 
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even joined or supported terrorist groups, including the Islamic State,171 though it is not clear to 
what extent these women have been coerced or are exercising false consciousness, as opposed to 
demonstrating their true agency.172   
 
c) Instrumentalizing Feminism Has Limitations and Risks 
 
As I have explored elsewhere,173 while instrumentalizing and mainstreaming feminism 
helps instantiate it in the “halls of power,”174 such “Governance Feminism”175 risks 
deradicalizing its liberatory potential. As Janet Halley and her co-authors warn, “[m]erging 
[feminism] into the mainstream can . . . consolidate a particularistic, identity-based project, 
sometimes at the expense of alternative affiliations that ignore the siren call of victimization and 
identity … [and] [s]ome of the best things within and about feminism get left out.”176 At its best, 
                                                          
171 Katrin Bennhold, For Woman Dead in French Police Raid, Unlikely Path to Terror, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/world/europe/hasna-aitboulahcen-paris-attacks.html; Katrin Bennhold, Jihad 
and Girl Power: How ISIS Lured 3 London Girls, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/world/europe/jihad-and-girl-power-how-isis-lured-3-london-teenagers.html; 
Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, Teenage Girl Leaves for ISIS, and Others Follow, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/25/world/from-studious-teenager-to-isis-recruiter.html; Suzanne Daley & Maia de 
la Baume, A French Town Reels After Teenage Girl Vanishes, Apparently to Join Jihadists, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/world/europe/a-french-town-reels-after-teenage-girl-vanishes-
apparently-to-join-jihadists.html; Azadeh Moaveni, ISIS Women and Enforcers in Syria Recount Collaboration, 
Anguish and Escape,  N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/world/middleeast/isis-
wives-and-enforcers-in-syria-recount-collaboration-anguish-and-escape.html. 
 
172 For thoughtful discussion of this topic, see, for example, Mia Bloom, DYING TO KILL: THE ALLURE OF SUICIDE 
TERROR (2005); Mia Bloom, BOMBSHELL: WOMEN AND TERRORISM (2011); Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Situating Women 
in Counterterrorism Discourses - Undulating Masculinities and Luminal Femininities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1085 (2013); 
Natalya Wallin, Power of Persuasion: A New Approach to Understanding Female Suicide Terrorism, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL.: WOMEN AROUND THE WORLD (Aug. 17, 2015), http://blogs.cfr.org/women-around-the-
world/2015/08/17/power-of-persuasion-a-new-approach-to-understanding-female-suicide-terrorism. See also 
Catherine Powell, Can the Chibok Girls Be Held Accountable for Boko Haram’s Atrocities?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL.: WOMEN AROUND THE WORLD (July 16, 2015), http://blogs.cfr.org/development-channel/2015/07/16/can-the-
chibok-girls-be-held-accountable-for-boko-harams-atrocities. Cf Stephanie McCurry, Enemy Women and the Laws 
of War in the American Civil War 1 (Aug. 10, 2016)(draft on file with author) (discussing how the Lieber Code 
fundamentally rewrote the distinction between combatants and civilians, “eviscerating [] the assumption of women’s 
innocence on which the identity of the civilian was (and is) premised.”). 
 
173 See Powell, Gender Indicators in Global Governance, supra note 6.  
 
174 JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 21 (2006). 
 
175 Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the International to the Local in 
Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary 
Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335 (2006). 
175 Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the International to the Local in 
Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary 
Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335 (2006). 
 
176 Janet Halley, Describing and Assessing Governance Feminism, in GOVERNANCE FEMINISM: AN INTRODUCTION 4 
(Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Rachel Rebouché & Hila Shamir eds.) (forthcoming 2016) (noting another cost of 
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Governance Feminism has helped justify greater funding for women’s issues by national 
governments and international institutions.177 At its worst, Governance Feminism can obscure 
parts of the feminist agenda that do not serve the goals of the broader agenda,178 justify strategies 
that undercut other feminist goals,179 and pave the way for other problematic policies and 
politics.180 Thus, the UN-commissioned global study on the implementation of Resolution 1325 
warns that “the agenda of 1325 should not be ‘securitized’ and women should never be used as 
instruments in any military strategy.”181 In sum, critics of the securitization approach argue that 
claims that women’s participation leads to more sustainable peace are exaggerated, inaccurate, 
and/or dangerous.    
 
III. A New Theoretical Frame: The Democratic Legitimacy Account 
 
Moving beyond the prevailing debate between the antisubordination and securitization 
accounts, the democratic legitimacy account illustrates that increasing women’s participation in 
peacemaking creates a more representative, universal, democratic, and fair process with greater 
buy-in from all, either because the process actually is more legitimate (normative legitimacy) or 
because it is perceived as more legitimate (sociological legitimacy). This Part identifies and 
theorizes a democratic legitimacy framework for WPS—an account eclipsed in the current 
debate. In light of the vulnerabilities inherent in both the antisubordination and securitization 
accounts of women’s participation, this Part proposes democratic legitimacy as an alternative 
justification that uncovers important values of women’s participation that the other two 
approaches miss.   
A. The Rationale 
 
                                                          
Governance Feminism: “Women benefit differentially; some are harmed; and conflicts among feminists about what 
worlds to imagine are prematurely settled.”).  
 
177 See Powell, Gender Indicators in Global Governance, supra note 6. 
 
178 Id. 
 
179 Coomaraswamy et al., supra note 15, at 384 (noting that while some counter-terrorism measures are justified to 
defend against the subjugation of women by extremists, such measures have occasionally had a chilling effect on 
fundraising efforts of particular women’s organizations, given limits on funding for organizations with even 
perceived or attenuated associations with presumed terrorists). 
 
180 See, e.g., Powell et al., supra note 170. This piece notes that while extending the U.S. military presence in 
Afghanistan could help bolster the capacity of the Afghan security sector to protect Afghan women and girls, the 
decision to delay the draw-down of U.S. troops also justified the use of drones in the region, which has led to 
civilian deaths and arguably intensified anti-American sentiment in the region. See Micah Zenko, What Happens if 
Afghanistan Shuts Down the U.S. Drone Program There?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 9, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/what-happens-if-afghanistan-shuts-down-the-us-drone-
program-there/255602.   
 
181 Coomaraswamy et al., supra note 15, at 14. 
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While overlapping with particular aspects of the other two WPS accounts, democratic 
legitimation also addresses distinct concerns that the two other approaches fail to capture.  
Democratic legitimation is different from the antisubordination approach because, rather than 
focus on opportunities for individual women (or even women as a group), the former focuses on 
the integrity of the broader process or institutions in question, which cannot claim to be 
legitimate if half of humanity is not represented.182 Democratic legitimacy is also different from 
the securitization account. While a more legitimate peace process that is more representative and 
inclusive will likely secure broader buy-in and therefore be more sustainable, the value of 
legitimacy sweeps much broader than the securitization approach by addressing fairness and 
democracy concerns as well as the durability of peace.  
 
The impact of women’s representation in the development of peace agreements (and in 
transitioning societies from conflict to peace) can be understood as strengthening the democratic 
legitimacy of not only the peace processes themselves but also the transitions and governance 
structures that flow from them. Legitimacy itself can be conceptualized in at least three ways:  
normative legitimacy, sociological legitimacy, and democratic legitimacy.183 This Part explains 
how women’s participation is important for both normative and sociological legitimacy. It then 
turns to the significance of women’s participation for democratic legitimacy and develops a 
theory that incorporates elements of the other two to help further conceptualize democratic 
legitimacy as a stronger basis for WPS than either the antisubordination or securitization 
approach. 
 
1. Normative Legitimacy 
 
 First, the underrepresentation of women in peace processes endangers the normative 
legitimacy of these processes because women and men approach peace processes differently 
based on their dissimilar roles in and experiences of war. As discussed in Part I.C., research 
suggests that women frequently bring different experiences and perspectives to the peace table 
and are therefore more likely to raise matters concerning human rights, justice, health, and 
employment.   
 
While there is limited research on gender and peace processes, scholarship on U.S. courts 
reflects that, whereas the gender of a judge typically has a minimal and sometimes absent effect 
on judicial outcomes, in cases raising gender concerns (e.g., sex discrimination cases and family 
law matters) the gender of the judge is correlated with different decision-making outcomes.184 In 
                                                          
182 Julie C. Suk, Quotas: From Discrimination to Democratic Legitimacy 9, Guest Lecture in Comparative Civil 
Rights Course, Stanford Law School (May 22, 2012) (draft on file with author). 
 
183 This approach borrows from and adapts Nienke Grossman’s work on gender and international courts. Cf. 
Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 53 (discussing these forms of legitimacy in the context of the representation 
of women judges sitting on international courts). 
 
184 Sally J. Kenney, Thinking About Gender and Judging, 15 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 87, 96-101 (2008). Nienke 
Grossman notes, “Especially since United States President Jimmy Carter made concerted efforts to diversify the 
United States federal bench, many scholars have studied the impact of gender (and race) on judging in the United 
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the context of sex discrimination cases, one study of U.S. federal appellate cases demonstrated 
that when a judge was male, a plaintiff was ten percentage points less likely to win.185 But male 
judges were more likely to rule for the plaintiff when a woman judge was on the same panel 
deciding the case.186 In fact, the survey concluded that “the presence of a female on a panel 
actually causes male judges to vote in a way they otherwise would not—in favor of plaintiffs.”187   
 
There is limited data on whether gender representation on international courts 
similarly affects outcomes, but prominent female judges who have served on international 
courts indicate that it does, at least in cases involving rape and other crimes of sexual 
violence. For example, former International Court of the Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia 
Judge Patricia Wald said: “A judge is the sum of her experiences and if she has suffered 
disadvantages or discrimination as a woman, she is apt to be sensitive to its subtle expressions 
or to paternalism.”188 She notes several important precedents involving gender crimes in 
cases in which at least one of the judges was a woman.189 While more skeptical about whether 
the gender of the judge makes a difference, former International Criminal Court (ICC) Judge 
Navanethem Pillay acknowledges that “women come with a particular sensitivity and 
understanding about what happens to people who are raped.”190 
 
The different experiences and priorities women bring to the peace table are largely 
attributable to the ways their views are informed by the different social roles women play.  
Thus, to say that women may bring different views to the peace table – which may (or may 
not) result in different outcomes – is not to say that women are biologically or inherently 
different from men. Nor does it insist that women will reach different substantive outcomes 
                                                          
States.”  Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 53. See Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on the Bench 
Mean for Justice?, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 117-20 (1999).   
 
185 Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 389, 390 (2010).  
  
186 Id. at 390, 406. 
  
187 Id. at 406; see also KARPOWITZ & MENDELBERG, supra note 12, at 239-272 (discussing how and when women’s 
participation shapes the group’s generosity). 
  
188 Wald, supra note 51, at 989. Judge Wald previously served on the United States Court of Appeals in Washington, 
D.C. Id.   
  
189 Patricia M. Wald, What Do Women Want from International Criminal Justice? To Help Shape the Law, 
INTLAWGRRLS (Oct 5, 2009), http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2009/10/what-do-women-want-from-
international.html. 
190 DANIEL TERRIS, CESARE P.R. ROMANO & LEIGH SWIGART, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES 48 (2007) (noting, however, that Judge Pillay has more 
generally contended that she does not think women judges “decide in a different way”). In addition to serving as a 
judge on the ICC, Judge Pillay was also the first non-white woman judge on the High Court of South Africa and 
served as President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. FACTBOX – South Africa’s Pillay is New 
Human Rights Chief, REUTERS (July 28, 2008), http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL843084620080728.  
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per se. This perspective does not rely on essentialism in the way the securitization approach 
frequently does, as it turns more on the fact that women typically bring different perspectives 
because they often have different social roles than men, and therefore women’s participation 
in decision making—whatever outcome is reached—bolsters the representativeness of the 
process.  
 
2. Sociological Legitimacy 
 
Second, even where individual women bring perspectives to the peace table that are not 
remarkably different than men nor more likely to lead to different substantive outcomes, the 
underrepresentation of women in a particular peace process undermines the sociological 
legitimacy for constituencies that nonetheless believe women negotiators will approach peace 
negotiations differently and represent the interests of women more fairly.191 For groups such as 
women, who have been traditionally excluded, discriminated against, and unfairly treated, 
inclusion in peace processes strengthens the sociological legitimacy of these processes. 
Exclusion perpetuates a perception of bias, which can undercut the legitimacy of a peace process 
when members of excluded groups view it as unrepresentative.192 For these reasons, women’s 
groups have lobbied aggressively for women to be appointed to international war crimes 
tribunals, even in the absence of firm evidence or guarantees that women judges would be more 
responsive to women’s concerns.193 For similar reasons, other constituencies have pushed for 
racial, national, and other types of balance on domestic and international courts.194 
 
3. Democratic Legitimacy 
 
Finally, gender composition is important for the democratic legitimacy of peace 
processes because representation is an important element of democratic institutions.195 As 
                                                          
191 Cf. Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 53, at 661. 
 
192 Id. 
 
193 Id. at 664 (noting, inter alia, the advocacy efforts of the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, which argued for 
gender balance and expertise on sexual violence in the staffing and operations of the International Criminal Court, 
on the grounds that failure to do so “might harm ‘perceptions of States, their overall attitude towards the Court, and 
in the long run, the Court’s efficacy and credibility.’”(quoting Medard R. Rwelamira, Composition and 
Administration of the Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: 
ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 357, 359 (Roy S. K. Lee ed., 1999))). 
 
194 See, e.g., Grossman, Sex on the Bench. supra note 53, at 665 (noting Nelson Mandela’s critique of the apartheid-
era judiciary in South Africa, in which Mandela asked a white magistrate: “Why is it that in this courtroom I face a 
white magistrate, am confronted by a white prosecutor, and escorted into the dock by a white orderly? Can anyone 
honestly and seriously suggest that in this type of atmosphere the scales of justice are evenly balanced?” (citing 
NELSON MANDELA, THE STRUGGLE IS MY LIFE: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS BROUGHT TOGETHER WITH 
HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS AND ACCOUNTS OF MANDELA IN PRISON BY FELLOW-PRISONERS 135 (1986))). 
 
195 Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 53, at 668.  
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Nienke Grossman notes, while normative and sociological legitimacy “focus on the relationship 
between sex representation, impartiality, and legitimacy,” democratic legitimacy “examines the 
relationship between representativeness qua representativeness and legitimacy.”196 Just as 
geographical diversity is important to the legitimacy of many democratic institutions, Grossman 
points out that “sex representation strengthens the legitimacy [of institutions] by reflecting the 
population subject to their authority, an important democratic value.”197 While Grossman’s work 
focuses on gender representation on international courts, the same underlying reasoning applies 
to gender representation in peace negotiations. 
 
The principle of democratic legitimacy applies beyond the formal state,198 even when 
representatives who negotiate over peace are not technically state officials—for example, 
because they represent an opposition group or are selected from civil society. Because peace 
processes, and the structures established as a result, wield public and legal authority, gender 
representation is an important aspect of their democratic legitimacy. In fact, peace processes 
frequently establish legal, political, economic, and social arrangements for societies transitioning 
from conflict to peace. 
 
Julie Suk’s work on gender quotas in Europe drives home the benefits of recasting gender 
representation as an issue of democratic legitimacy rather than antisubordination.199 As Suk 
notes, in the debate over gender quotas in France, when women’s representation was framed as 
“equal opportunity,” “equal access,” or “affirmative action,” the push for gender quotas was not 
successful.200 Under these circumstances, the primary purpose—to enhance women’s 
opportunities to compete for positions of power so that their voice as a group could be heard—
was viewed as a special interest and was divisive.201 But when gender quotas were reframed 
more recently as “parity democracy,” gender quotas in France united, rather than divided, the 
republic, since the French identified with the universal aspiration of democracy shared by both 
men and women.202 Rather than “enhancing women’s opportunities as individuals or even as a 
group,” the primary aim of gender parity “is to legitimize the exercise of political, economic, and 
social power.”203 Critically, as Suk notes, “the new model embraced gender balance as a 
                                                          
196 Id. 
 
197 Id. at 668-69. 
 
198 See Gráinne De Búrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 226-27 
(2008). 
   
199 Suk, supra note 182, at 9. 
 
200 Id. at 8. 
  
201 Id. at 8-9. 
  
202  Id. 
 
203  Id. at 9. 
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collective democratic goal rather than equal opportunity for a minority group.”204 After all, 
“women were ‘not a lobby’ but ‘half of the sovereign people, half of the human species’ . . . 
[and] “[d]emocratic governance could not claim to be universal or legitimate if half of humanity 
were not represented.”205    
 
By valuing women as worthy of participation, democratic legitimacy embraces their role 
as equal citizens while going beyond antisubordination’s claim to equality for the sake of its 
direct beneficiaries. As the slogan popularized by disability activists but also used by feminists 
goes: “Nothing about us without us.”206 Viewed in the context of democratic legitimacy, gender 
representation benefits the community as a whole, because the overall process—and the decision 
making that flows from it—is more representative and thus better. Echoing John Hart Ely’s 
political process point,207 the argument here is that by democratizing the process, democratic 
inclusion of women helps to address the problems that occur when groups are systematically 
excluded.208  
 
While WPS is a relatively young field, women’s participation as judges on international 
courts once again provides a useful analogy for considering the importance of gender 
representation for democratic legitimacy. Formal requirements for gender diversity represent a 
growing trend on international courts, where calls for diversity in appointments are often framed 
in terms of “representation” and democratic legitimacy.209 Along with geographic representation, 
the Rome Statute of the ICC requires “a fair representation of female and male judges” as well as 
individuals with legal expertise on violence against women and children.210 Governments, 
                                                          
204  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
205 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 
206 See, e.g., JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US (1998). While this expression has its roots in a 
Central European phrase from centuries ago, it made its way to the United States and is closely analogous to the 
familiar American Revolution slogan, “No taxation without representation.” See NORMAN DAVIES, HEART OF 
EUROPE: THE PAST IN POLAND’S PRESENT 261 (1984). 
 
207 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Ely famously made the following observation about 
unfairness in the political process: 
 
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins are choking off the 
channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) 
though, no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective 
majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced 
refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the protection 
afforded other groups by a representative system. 
 
Id. at 103. 
 
208 Id. 
 
209 Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 53, at 669-70. 
 
210 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 ILM 999, 1020 (1998) (Rome Statute) art. 36(8)(a)-(b). 
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through their diplomatic representatives, have noted the importance of diversity on other war 
crimes tribunals as well. For example, Bosnia’s Ambassador to the UN, Mohamed Sacirbey, 
criticized the fact that there were no Muslim judges on the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), stating: “It is absurd that most of the victims are Muslim, yet 
they have no representatives on the Tribunal.”211 As for gender diversity, U.S. State Department 
Legal Adviser Conrad Harper indicated that the Clinton Administration had an interest in 
nominating a woman as an ICTY judge “because of the use of rape as an instrument of warfare 
in the Bosnian conflict.”212 Similar arguments were raised with regard to the International 
Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda (ICTR).213 After the International Criminal Court Statute was 
signed, the UN Security Council amended the statutes for the ICTY and ICTR to add ad litem 
judges and stated that, in nominating candidates, states should take “into account the importance 
of a fair representation of female and male candidates.”214  
 
While courts are different from peace negotiations, the argument for democratic 
representation can be applied with equal, if not greater, force in the latter context. Peace 
agreements can lead to broad institutional, legal, political, and economic changes affecting the 
whole society, whereas courts are typically more insulated from democratic accountability, and 
court decisions are frequently limited to the facts or circumstances of a particular case. The fact 
that women comprise roughly half the world’s population lends further support to the assertion 
that female representation is an important aspect of the democratic legitimacy of peace 
processes.   
 
4. Democratic Legitimacy:  Both Normative and Sociological 
 
                                                          
211 IAIN GUEST, ON TRIAL: THE UNITED NATIONS, WAR CRIMES AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 131 (1995). 
   
212 MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL 
SINCE NUREMBERG 66 (1997). 
   
213 Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 53, at 671 (noting that in lamenting the underrepresentation of women 
judges on the Rwanda Tribunal, Judge Wald made the broader observation that, “[i]n general, women had been 
woefully underrepresented on all international tribunals” (quoting Wald, supra note 51, at 991)). 
 
214 Id. (citing Security Council Res No 1329, UN Doc S/RES/1329 (2000), Annex I, Art 13; Security Council Res 
No 1431, UN Doc S/RES/1431 (2002), Annex I, Art 12).  Grossman notes, however, “Neither statute was amended 
to include female and male permanent judges.” Id. at 671 n.131.   
 
Outside the field of international criminal law, there has been a move to include representatives from blocks of 
countries that lack power. The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding permits developing countries that are 
parties to a dispute against a developed country to request a panel member from a developing state—the emphasis 
being not on general geographic diversity, but rather on the inclusion of an adjudicator from a developing country.   
Id. at 665-66. Importantly, Grossman points out: “It is not surprising that developing countries demanded 
developing-country judges, given Third World critiques of international law and institutions.” Id. at 666 (citing 
Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in 
Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77 (2003); and Makau Mutua & Antony Anghie, What is TWAIL?, 94 AM. 
SOC. INTL. L. PROC. 31 (2000)). 
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Taken together, these three approaches to legitimacy affirm the importance of 
representation to advance fairness (whether in reality or only in popular perception) and 
democratic values. In fact, a theory of democratic legitimacy that incorporates normative and 
sociological legitimacy clarifies how democratic legitimation provides a sounder basis for WPS 
than either the antisubordination or securitization account.   
 
First, an account of democratic legitimacy is partially normative, because 
“representation is an important democratic value.”215 Moreover, women’s participation can 
contribute to a process that is not only procedurally more representative, but substantively 
more representative in terms of the different experiences and priorities women bring to the 
peace table—regardless of whether or not the substantive outcome is different (i.e., more 
peace-oriented, as the securitization approach assumes). As is the case with courts—where 
evidence shows that women judges are more likely to make different decisions than their 
male counterparts in cases involving sex discrimination or family law216—evidence also 
shows that women bring different experiences and priorities to the peace table on matters 
such as human rights, justice, health, and employment issues. This account avoids 
essentialism, because evidence demonstrates that the different perspectives women bring to 
the peace table are based on the different social roles women play, as opposed to biological 
or other inherent differences. Nor does a democratic legitimation account insist that women 
will reach different substantive outcomes per se; rather, they will bolster the 
representativeness of the process and the perspectives—the substantive inputs—that shape 
the process. 
 
Second, an account of democratic legitimacy is partially sociological, because women’s 
participation can contribute to a process that is perceived as more substantively representative in 
terms of the outcome of the decision making—again, regardless of the peace-orientation of the 
outcome. As discussed in Part III.A.2., even where individual women bring perspectives to the 
peace table that are not notably different than men’s nor more likely to lead to different 
substantive outcomes, the representation of women enhances the sociological legitimacy of the 
process for constituencies that believe women negotiators will approach peace negotiations 
differently and represent the interests of women in these negotiations more sufficiently. For 
historically excluded groups, such as women, inclusion in peace processes strengthens the 
sociological legitimacy of the process and therefore its democratic pedigree. Exclusion, on the 
other hand, perpetrates a perception of bias, which can undermine the legitimacy of a peace 
process, where the process is not viewed as representative.     
 
By incorporating normative and sociological elements, democratic legitimacy provides a 
nuanced justification for WPS not only because women’s participation enhances 
representativeness as a matter of process, but also because it strengthens representativeness in 
terms of substantive inputs, regardless of substantive outcomes. By providing a third way of 
rationalizing women’s participation beyond antisubordination and securitization accounts, 
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democratic legitimacy offers an alternative justification of WPS. In contrast to the 
antisubordination framework, which emphasizes equal access for women as individuals (or as a 
group)—and which critiques disparage as “preferential treatment” or catering to “special 
interests”217—legitimacy offers an account of the representativeness of the process by which 
decision making and power are allocated. In contrast to the securitization narrative, which rests 
on essentialist assumptions about women and an as-yet incomplete empirical record, democratic 
legitimacy addresses the fairness of excluding half of humanity in processes whose outcomes 
will be imposed on all.   
 
In its quest for fairness and meaningful equality, democratic legitimacy overlaps with 
aspects of the antisubordination account. As with the antisubordination framework, the idea of 
democratic legitimation is aimed at opening up opportunities for individuals and groups. But the 
democratic legitimacy approach goes further by insisting on deep inclusion of those previously 
excluded as a way of strengthening the process for everyone. Importantly, as with 
antisubordination, democratic legitimation is grounded in a model of inclusion that can apply to 
subordinated groups beyond women, as well as to inequality at the intersection of vectors of 
inequality.218 Kimberle Crenshaw originally developed the legal theory of “intersectionality” in 
the context of antisubordination theory. But Crenshaw’s powerful insight—that law masks the 
intersection of antisubordination and must be reoriented to address intersectional inequality—can 
also be applied in the context of democratic legitimacy, given its applicability to vectors of 
inequality beyond gender, such as race and ethnicity. Applying intersectionality from a 
democratic legitimacy standpoint, individuals who live their lives at the intersection of gender 
and other vectors of inequality must be included in democratic institutions and processes—such 
as peace-making processes—because their participation enhances the democratic pedigree of the 
process and thereby strengthens its legitimacy and prospects for peace for all. Moreover, by 
emphasizing democratic representation, democratic legitimation depends on local ownership and 
bottom-up solutions, emphasizing participation and leadership of women in war zones rather 
than female global elites. Democracy’s insistence on representation and accountability favors 
devolution to local law-making and therefore greater inclusion and diversity along all 
demographic axes, in contrast to merely empowering the few global elites and cosmopolitans 
who rise to the top precisely because they can operate on terms set by other elites.  
 
A democratic legitimation approach also shares common ground with elements of the 
securitization account. For example, because the very fact of women’s participation creates a 
more representative process (or at least a perception of one), it secures broader public support 
and is therefore more sustainable. But the idea motivating legitimacy is the representativeness of 
the process, regardless of whether a more inclusive process leads to more durable, secure 
outcomes.   
 
B. Potential Critiques 
 
                                                          
217 For persuasive rebuttals to these critics, see supra note 17. 
 
218 See Crenshaw, supra note 18. 
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I anticipate at least three potential criticisms of the legitimacy account, which I outline 
and respond to in this Section.   
 
1. The Challenge of Balkanization 
 
One critique is that creating a democratically legitimate peace process may require the 
use of gender quotas as one potential mechanism for improving representation. Some fear quotas 
could balkanize the process. Even though the reasoning underlying legitimacy is distinct from 
the antisubordination rationale, as a practical matter, gender quotas can be used to advance the 
goals underlying either account to advance women’s participation in peace processes. As 
discussed above, in France219 the use of gender quotas to advance the interest of individual 
women (or women as a group), per the antisubordination approach, led to division and 
balkanization.220 However, when gender quotas were reframed as promoting representative 
forms of governance, “gender balance” received wider support and was viewed as promoting 
democracy, social cohesion, and antibalkanization.221 
 
2. The Challenge of Procedural Minimalism 
 
A second potential criticism is that democratic legitimacy is a weak, thin account of 
women’s participation in peace and security because it merely advances minimalist 
proceduralism rather than robust substantive change. However, the fact that the democratic 
legitimacy rationale is procedural, universalist, and neutral (at least on the surface) is precisely 
its appeal and efficacy, from both conceptual and practical perspectives. The democratic 
legitimacy approach ushers in transformative, structural change that can, in fact, undo the deep-
seated substantive inequality that antisubordination proponents seek, while also addressing the 
need for deeper buy-in to agreements that securitization adherents desire. As a practical matter, 
cloaking women’s participation in the frame of democratic legitimacy is akin to using a Trojan 
horse. Increasing participation by women not only bolsters the democratic pedigree of the 
peacemaking process, but “women’s involvement in brokering peace often serves to [further] 
crystallize women’s movements, thereby emboldening women’s rights and enabling their public 
leadership in a range of arenas.”222  
 
3. The Challenge of John Hart Ely 
 
                                                          
219 See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text (discussing Julie Suk’s work on gender quotas in France). 
 
220 For a discussion of how the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence reflects a concern with “antibalkanization,” 
see Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, supra note 14, at 1278 (discussing “how Justice Kennedy 
reasons from antibalkanization values in the recent cases of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1 and Ricci v. DeStefano”). 
 
221 Suk, Quotas and Consequences, supra note 16, at 228-49 (describing the use of gender quotas in Europe as 
enhancing social cohesion and having an antibalkanizing effect).  
 
222 Verveer, supra note 154. 
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This leads to a third potential critique, which is that while the idea of democratic 
legitimacy draws inspiration from John Hart Ely’s political process point,223 Ely himself favors 
protection in the political process only for racial minorities, not necessarily for women. His 
book, Democracy and Distrust, is a defense of Brown v. Board of Education and protection of 
racial inequality as a suspect classification due to underrepresentation in the political process.224  
But in The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, Ely is skeptical that the same 
analysis can apply with equal force to women, at least as far as abortion rights are concerned.225  
While acknowledging that there are few women in most legislatures, he notes as well that “no 
fetuses sit in our legislatures.”226 Setting aside the abortion context, women are largely 
underrepresented in political and peace processes.227 This underrepresentation is in large part 
based on the fact that “[i]n the modern European nation-states, men have been expected to 
participate as citizens of the state, and market-maximizers in civil society . . . [while] social 
reproduction tasks get allocated to women, despite the formal redefinition of women as citizens 
and market participants.”228 The notion of democratic legitimacy paves the way for increasing 
women’s representation as “a strategy for disrupting the assumption that democratic citizens are 
‘men.’”229 
IV. Inclusive Security: Moving Beyond Gender Essentialism 
 
A final benefit of the democratic legitimation approach is that it holds the greatest 
potential for moving beyond existing flawed accounts and reframing WPS as “inclusive 
security.”230 Ambassador Swanee Hunt, for instance, has sought to reframe WPS around the idea 
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that “inclusive security”—security that includes women’s participation—leads to more 
sustainable peace and security. While reconceiving WPS as inclusive security is a brilliant 
undertaking, changing the terminology alone is only the first step. Shifting the normative 
understanding of why inclusive security deserves support is the next step and will benefit from 
the democratic legitimacy framework.   
 
Placing the idea of inclusion within the security paradigm is critical because, as 
Ambassador Hunt notes, “in much of the policy world, when you talk about women, one eye 
glazes over. And when you talk about peace, the other eye glazes over.”231 Framing the issue as 
“inclusive security” places women at the center of security matters and emphasizes the value that 
women bring to the table, while keeping policymakers engaged and side-stepping the most 
essentialist aspects of WPS norms.   
 
Still, Hunt relies largely on the antisubordination and securitization accounts. From an 
antisubordination perspective, she argues for opening up opportunities for women; from a 
securitization perspective, she contends that the unique perspectives women bring to the table 
lead to more sustainable peace because women “perform” differently from men. For example, 
Hunt argues that women negotiators often have a more collaborative style, making it easier for 
them to work through differences:232 “[O]n the ground, women may be more in touch with their 
community, knowing which teenagers are disaffected or most likely to fall in with radical 
groups.”233 Moreover, in many parts of the world, “women’s status as second class citizens 
allows them to go places without being noticed.”234 However, we do not know whether women 
will continue to “perform” in these ways as they move into positions of power. 
 
As demonstrated by the empirical research discussed in Part I, because civilian women 
often experience war differently than combatant men, at least in the short term (while this 
gendered divide still exists), gender-balanced processes can lead to more durable peace, so long 
as other conditions are present. However, because gender is socially constructed and identity is 
“tenuously constituted in time,”235 over the longer run, the essentialist view in the securitization 
account that women perform in ways that lead to more sustainable peace may not be sustainable 
if, as gender roles change, women begin to perform in different ways.  
 
Borrowing from the idea of transitional justice—which addresses justice concerns in 
societies transitioning from systems of grave injustice (such as authoritarianism or apartheid) to 
more democratic arrangements—I view WPS as an element of a broader gender equality 
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transition that is shifting societies around the world from systems in which women are largely 
excluded to structures that are more inclusive and reflect more equal distributions of power (at 
least along the axis of gender). As Antonio Gramsci noted, “The crisis consists precisely in the 
fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of 
morbid symptoms appear.”236 Most women still carry the burden of inequality and continue to be 
excluded from combat and other peace and security positions that result in a gendered experience 
of war. While gender roles are changing and women are securing greater equality and inclusion, 
this process is rapid in some countries at times and is gradual and slow in others. WPS is a 
vehicle to assist in the gender equality transition. 
 
A democratic legitimacy account of inclusive security can reframe the WPS debate, 
because legitimacy turns on enhancing the representativeness of the process as a whole, rather 
than opening up opportunities for women per se or expecting that women will “perform” in a 
particular way. As this Article’s discussion of gender quotas in France indicates, when women’s 
representation is conceived of as turning on democratic legitimacy, rather than antisubordination 
concerns, the primary aim becomes legitimizing the exercise of power rather than enhancing the 
opportunities of individuals or a group. A legitimacy framework creates a new theoretical model 
in which gender balance is a collective democratic aim, rather than an equal opportunity right for 
a specific group. In reconceiving inclusive security, the legitimacy framework underscores the 
fact that governance cannot be universal, democratic, accountable, or legitimate if half of 
humanity is not represented. 
 
 A democratic legitimacy account of “inclusive security” also moves the WPS field away 
from an approach that essentializes women or that turns on a rigid construction of what women 
are ultimately capable of representing—both in the democratic theory sense of representation and 
in the gender performance sense. In fact, Ambassador Hunt acknowledges that women should be 
free to choose militarism over peace, even while she believes women are less likely to do so than 
men.237 
 
 While law has traditionally seen gender as an unbending category,238 this paradigm may 
shift as women increasingly move into traditionally male sectors of the economy and as more 
people recognize that gender identity may be relatively fluid. Today, though, many women who 
rise to positions of power still wonder whether they have to become the functional equivalent of 
men239—that is, “persons who spend little or no time on the tasks of social reproduction,” 
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because they are “either childless or capable of avoiding their social reproduction functions (by 
delegating to spouses, family members, nannies, daycares, or schools).”240   
 
A further challenge (and opportunity) is that, now that the Obama Administration has 
dropped the combat ban on women, we must think in more complex ways about masculinity and 
WPS. Women will be permitted to fight in combat position in the U.S. military on an equal basis, 
as women already do in the Israeli and other militaries. 
 
Ultimately, the success of inclusive security may turn on whether countries are willing to 
develop more inclusive processes more generally, as through the development of National 
Action Plans. Rather than being developed by the UN and filtered from there to national 
governments in a top-down fashion, NAPs are frequently demanded by NGOs and developed by 
national governments in close coordination with NGOs. For example, NGOs in the United States 
demanded that the Obama Administration adopt a NAP, and the Administration eventually 
developed one through an interagency group coordinated by the White House National Security 
Council staff, with extensive input from representatives of civil society in the United States 
(many with experience overseas in conflict zones) and congressional staff.241 Additionally, “U.S. 
representatives in the field engaged in consultations with women and women’s organizations, 
gender equality advocates, and government interlocutors to ensure that their perspectives and 
interests informed the Plan.”242 More inclusive, bottom-up processes follow the feminist 
methodology of participatory decision-making.243 Participatory decision-making could more 
effectively disrupt the structures of dominance and subordination that have long excluded 
women from matters of war and peace. Drawing on the theory of international lawmaking from 
the bottom,244 such strategies could also pave the way toward solutions that are more responsive 
to affected individuals and communities, who will have a greater stake and deeper investment in 
sustaining solutions they are involved in developing. Thus, these approaches can be more 
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effective as a practical matter as well as more respectful of the integrity of individuals whose 
lives are affected by peace and security measures.  
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article offers a new framework based on the theory of democratic legitimacy as an 
alternative justification for increasing women’s participation in developing peace agreements.  
This novel approach can more effectively reframe WPS matters as “inclusive security” and move 
the field beyond the prevailing antisubordination and securitization approaches. By proposing 
and theorizing democratic legitimation as an alternative account of WPS, this Article identifies a 
descriptively and normatively more appealing way to maneuver around formal equality on the 
one hand, and instrumentalist claims that women will “save” the world on the other. After all, 
not all women are “peace-loving,” particularly in a world where women who succeed are often 
those who can succeed on terms defined by men. Further, traditional expectations of gender 
performance reify the category of “woman” so that the category restricts as much as it liberates. 
 
In sum, the field of WPS should not be merely a tool for placing women’s faces at the 
peace and security table. It should be a vehicle for feminist and democratic values to co-opt 
global governance. Promoting women’s leadership and representation is good as a matter of 
equality, as a matter of “waging” peace, and as a way of enhancing the legitimacy and 
democratic accountability of peacemaking. But simply increasing the numbers of women in 
these fora may not in itself secure feminist goals or more sustainable peace over the long run, as 
women leaders themselves become elites and move away from community concerns. Because 
“the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,”245 the turn toward more 
participatory mechanisms—such as National Action Plans—in contrast to the typical top-down 
approach of most UN and national policy-making may be key to WPS’s ultimate success, at least 
on feminist terms.  
 
In the end, if peace and security policymaking grows more inclusive in various ways— 
including with the participation of women and other members of the community who may be 
underrepresented246—it will not only lead to better outcomes, but, as John Hart Ely’s political 
process theory suggests,247 will also be perceived as more legitimate and will secure greater buy-
in from those the policies are intended to serve. So long as being a woman is a proxy for bringing 
different experiences and perspectives to the peace table—thanks to gendered social roles and 
the fact that (civilian) women often experience war differently from (combatant) men—women’s 
participation in peacemaking will help legitimize peace processes. In democratizing peace 
processes and the governing structures that flow from them, women can still “save” the world, 
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but through a different mode than the predominant instrumentalist securitization discourse would 
have us believe. 
